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Fair Measures:
A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action"
Jerry Kangf
Mahzarin R. Banajift
Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come
down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever
genuinely to become the country's law and practice.
— Justice Ginsburg,
dissenting in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena^
One thing I have leamed in a long life: that all our science,
measured against reality, is primitive and childlike—and yet it is
the most precious thing we have.
— Albert Einstein^
INTRODUCTION: A NEW BEGINNING
The term "affirmative action" includes a broad range of policies and
practices designed to promote equality in ways not strictly required by
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antidiscrimination law alone.^ Since its inception in the 19608," affirmative
action has produced volumes of moral, legal, and policy arguments both to
justify and undermine its very existence. The original framing and subse-
quent discourse have been premised largely on historical and moral-
philosophical arguments, which are now well rehearsed and not especially
persuasive to those who disagree. Indeed, we seem to be at a deadlock of
policy and principle, resistant to any fundamental reexamination. What
might lead us out of this stasis?
We believe that new facts recently discovered in the mind and behav-
ioral sciences can potentially transform both lay and expert conceptions of
affirmative action. Specifically, the science of implicit social cognition
(ISC) can help us revise the very meaning of certain affirmative action pre-
scriptions by updating our understanding of human nature and its social
development.
The science of ISC examines those mental processes that operate
without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless influ-
ence fxindamental evaluations of individuals and groups. As described by
Anthony Greenwald and Linda Krieger in this Symposium, evidence from
hundreds of thousands of individuals across the globe shows that (1) the
magnitude of implicit bias toward members of outgroups or disadvantaged
groups is large,' (2) implicit bias often conflicts with conscious attitudes,
endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior,* (3) implicit bias influences
evaluations of and behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias,'
and (4) self, situational, or broader cultural interventions can correct sys-
tematic and consensually shared implicit bias.' As disturbing as this evi-
dence is, there is too much of it to be ignored. Moreover, recent discoveries
regarding malleability of bias provide the basis to imagine both individual
and institutional change.
Behavioral realism takes ISC science seriously. The methodology of
behavioral realism forces the law to confront an increasingly accurate
3. We use the term "affirmative action" as it is used colloquially. It includes a broad range of
policies and practices that are designed to respond to past discrimination, prevent current
discrimination, and promote certain societal goals such as social stability or improved pedagogy.
Affirmative action programs may be facially race- or gender-neutral (for example, broadcasting widely
a particular employment opportunity) or race- or gender-contingent (for example, providing some
resource to a woman or racial/ethnic minority under circumstances in which that person would not have
received the resource but for that person's status as a woman or minority).
4. See generally SAMUEL LEITER & WILLIAM M. LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLICY: AN OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS (2002); JOHN DAVID
SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(1996).
5. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 954-58 (2006).
6. Id. at 953.
7. W. at 953-54, 961-62.
8. Id. at 962-65.Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873907
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description of human decision making and behavior, as provided by the
social, biological, and physical sciences. Behavioral realism identifies na-
ive theories of human behavior latent in the law and legal institutions. It
then juxtaposes these theories against the best scientific knowledge avail-
able to expose gaps between assumptions embedded in law and reality de-
scribed by science. When behavioral realism identifies a substantial gap,
the law should be changed to comport with science.' If legal actors and
policy makers decline to revise the law, they should act transparently and
provide the prudential, economic, political, or religious reasons for retain-
ing a less accurate and outdated view.
Behavioral realism is more a methodology than a set of first-order
normative commitments or policy preferences. Of course, the methodology
relies on assumptions and values inherent in the conduct of modem sci-
ence, which supposes that the causal processes of the real world exist and
operate independent of what we know or think about them, and that the
scientific method provides one of the best ways of understanding those
causal processes.'" We further recognize that empirical findings cannot re-
place values, and by themselves, do not dictate any single course of ac-
tion." If there is any value judgment embedded in behavioral realism
besides those intrinsic to the scientific method, it is a second-order com-
mitment against hypocrisy and self-deception. The law views itself as
achieving just, fair, or at least reasonable resuhs. If science reveals that the
law is failing to do so because it is predicated on erroneous models of hu-
man behavior, then the law must transparently account for the gap instead
of ignoring its existence.
Using behavioral realism as our legal approach and ISC as the sci-
ence, we seek to revise the affirmative action conversation. First, we pro-
vide a new temporal framing for much affinnative action discourse based
on the evidence of pervasive implicit bias. No longer do we have to choose
between a backward-looking frame of corrective justice (e.g., compensa-
tion for slavery) and a forward-looking frame of utilitarian engineering
(e.g., potential pedagogical benefit). Instead, we can now view core
"affirmative action" programs as responses to discrimination in the here
and now. We do not dismiss the significance of a historical view and its
moral pull, or the potential benefits in social stability and economic growth
9. We are not suggesting that any such gap necessarily exists everywhere in the law. See. e.g.,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571,
608-18 (1998) (suggesting that the law accounts for hindsight bias).
10. Cf IAN SHAPIRO, FLIGHT FROM REALITY 8-9 (2005) (identifying these qualities as core
commitments).
11. We are also mindful of how political agendas can be cloaked as "mere empirical
refinements." Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge
Posner, 97 MiCH. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (1999) (criticizing Judge Richard Posner for "disguis[ing]
theoretical difference as commitment to empirical fact").1066 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
arising from diversity. But we contend that a presentist framing that ex-
poses and responds to pervasive implicit bias—even in those who genu-
inely believe themselves to be bias-free—^provides an independent and
compelling case for action.
Second, and closely connected, we update the scientific case for the
mismeasurement of merit. Critics of affirmative action argue that affirma-
tive action circumvents merit. However, the presence of implicit bias can
produce discrimination by causing the very basis of evaluation, merit, to be
mismeasured. This insight reframes certain affirmative action programs not
as "preferential treatment" but as an opportunity for more accurate meas-
ures.
Third, we analyze ISC findings to suggest new approaches to amelio-
rating the problem of bias, or debiasing.^^ Affirmative action has some-
times been credited for producing the sort of integration that reduces
stereotypes and prejudice. The mechanism for this benefit is the well-
known "social contact hypothesis" (SCH), which social psychologists have
refined, complicated, and challenged over the past five decades.'^ ISC sug-
gests experimenting with debiasing mechanisms different fi-om the tradi-
tionally recommended peer-to-peer social contact; potential techniques
include self-propelled attitude makeovers, mental "contact" through im-
agery, and exposure to debiasing agents.
In the Conclusion, we suggest a fourth and final insight—a new end-
ing for affirmative action. In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O'Connor sug-
gested a twenty-five year fuse on affirmative action.''* In our view,
however, the lifespan for certain affirmative action programs should be
guided by evidence of bias rather than any arbitrary or hopeful deadline.
Now that we can measure threats to fair treatment—^threats that lie in every
mind—such data should be a crucial guide to ending affirmative action.
We suggest a terminus when measures of implicit bias for a region or na-
tion are at zero or some rough behavioral equivalent. At this point, implicit
bias would align with an explicit creed of equal treatment. It would fulfill
collective aspirations to behave in accordance with explicitly held values.
A nomenclature clarification: although we use the term "affirmative
action," we find it too freighted to be analytically useful. As we make spe-
cific recommendations based on our analysis of ISC, we employ where
12. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law (Nov. 18, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, Yale Legal Theory Workshop, on file with authors); see also Barueh
Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES 423 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (discussing debiasing to counter certain heuristics and biases); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1491, 1537 (2005) (discussing behavioral realist research
agenda in terms of "debiasing" solutions).
13. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2006).
14. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").2006] FAIR MEASURES 1067
possible a different term, "fair measures." "Fair" connotes the moral intui-
tion that being fair involves an absence of unwarranted discrimination, by
which we mean unjustified social category-contingent behavior.'^ The term
also connotes accuracy in assessment. "Measure" has a double meaning as
well: measurement and an intervention intentionally taken to solve a prob-
lem.
This renaming is substantive not cosmetic. Some fair measures we
advocate—for example, anonymous evaluations—would not be construed
as affirmative action as much as antidiscrimination. In this sense, fair
measures include items not conventionally contained in the affirmative ac-
tion label. Conversely, some forms of what is now called affirmative ac-
tion—for example, reparations on a purely corrective justice theory, or
racial minority hiring to generate greater firm revenues—could not be
strictly justified as a fair measure. Hence, fair measures are both broader
and narrower than affirmative action. Our case in favor of fair measures
says little for or against other "affirmative action" or social justice inter-
ventions outside its purview.
I
DISCRIMINATION NOW, SOLUTIONS NOW
A. Conventional Thinking: Backward and Forward
The relationship between the problem of discrimination and the solu-
tion of affirmative action is not straightforward. To some, affirmative ac-
tion principally corrects historical discrimination against subordinated
social groups. This backward-looking defense of affirmative action, sound-
ing in corrective justice,'* runs into well-known political and legal
15. To elaborate further, "discrimination" involves different treatment by a perceiver
(discdininator) of a target (victim) based on the social category to which the target has been mapped. A
combination of stereotypes (cognitive component) about and attitudes (affective component) toward the
target's social category causes the perceiver to treat the target differently. In our definition of
discrimination, the actor's self-awareness of both the different treatment and its actual causes is
irrelevant. Finally, discrimination can range from warranted to unwarranted, as a function of the
applicable moral and legal frameworks. For example, in the United States today, we believe that there
is wide consensus that discrimination justified on the grounds of White genetic supremacy is
unwarranted both morally and legally. Other cases are in greater dispute, such as discrimination to
pursue corrective justice. In this Article, when we use the term "discrimination," we generally mean
unwarranted AncnmaiaXion. If we mean otherwise, we signal accordingly.
16. Roughly speaking, corrective justice is the idea that those who have wronged a person have a
moral obligation to make amends to the person and make that person whole. The classical citation is to
Aristotle, who called this "justice in rectification." See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 125-28
(Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1985). Backward looking justifications may also sound in
terms of retributive justice, which emphasizes the punishment of the wrongdoer over making the victim
whole.1068 CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
obstacles.'^ For example, our society tends to view discrimination as a spe-
cies of individual tort. Accordingly, any claim for remedy must—more or
less—identify the wrong, the specific perpetrator, and the specific victim.'*
Only after all three have been confidently specified will the law require the
specific wrongdoer to provide proportional redress to the specific victim.
Affirmative action as traditionally understood does not fit this narrow
model." As for perpetrators, slave-owners are long dead, and those who
have inherited advantages are not held directly accountable for what their
ancestors did decades or centuries ago.^" Not surprisingly. Whiteness is not
viewed as a corporation that carries its specific debts forward.^' Further,
the beneficiaries of affirmative action today (e.g., recent minority immi-
grants) are not regarded as the specific victims of the prior discrimination,
or even their heirs. Thus, any benefit they receive is decried as "unjust en-
richment"."
Constitutional law generally reflects these sentiments. Race-conscious
affirmative action programs must undergo the same strict scrutiny reserved
for Jim Crow laws." Further, the state cannot have the declared objective
17. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 92 (1986) (noting how this framing "invites claims that neither
nonvictims should benefit, nor nonsinners pay").
18. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MiNN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-
54 (1978); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1407, 1412-
13 (1990) (describing "perpetrator perspective").
19. See generally Kenneth Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104
CoLUM. L. REV. 60, 61-62 (2004) (noting the awkwardness of compensation for past discrimination
justification).
20. This argument is made even more specifically about slavery reparations. See, e.g., David
Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks—and Racist Tool, Mar.
12, 2001, http://www.adversity.net/reparations/anti_reparations_ad.htm. For responses, see, e.g.,
Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 308-12 (2003).
21. According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in 2002, only 6% of Whites agreed
that the United States government should make eash payments to those descendents of slaves. When
asked about corporations who profited from slavery, 11 % of Whites responded that they should make
cash payments to descendents of slaves. When the form of reparations was not eash payment but a
scholarship fiind, 35% of Whites agreed that corporations who profited from slavery should pay.
PollingReport.eom, Race and Ethnicity, http://www.pollingreport.eoni/race (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
For reasons why American society, if not Whiteness per se, must carry its debts forward for the legacy
of slavery and discrimination against African-Americans, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives
Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 715-
26 (2004).
22. Of course. White privilege can be seen as the more significant problem of "unjust
enrichment." See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
23. See. e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (requiring strict
scrutiny for race-conscious affirmative action, even if conducted by the federal government); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring same strict scrutiny for state and local
governments).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1069
of remedying general "societal discrimination."^'' Instead, it must only
remedy ongoing acts of discrimination or "lingering effects" of prior dis-
crimination^^ evidenced by particularized and reliable legislative, judicial,
or administrative fmdings.^^ In addition, the affirmative action program
must be narrowly tailored, which typically requires consideration of race
neutral alternatives, careful demarcation of the beneficiary class, limited
period of operation, and minimization of burden on those excluded from
the affirmative action program.^' The law prohibits inflexible quotas that
maintain a strict racial balance.^*
In response to such political and legal constraints on backward-
looking justifications for affirmative action, liberal proponents have
adopted instead a forward-looking justificatory frame.^' These proponents
rally around "diversity," praising its pedagogicaP" and quality-of-service
benefits.^' By sidestepping the blame-game and enlarging the class of indi-
rect beneficiaries (e.g., everyone in the classroom benefits from class
24. See. e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24 (2003); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) ("This Court never has held that societal
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination for fear of
harming innocent third parties); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalizing And Defining Racial
Equality: The Dark Side o/Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 221, 230 n.53 (2004) (tracing doctrinal
history ofthis position, starting from Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke to Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Grutter).
25. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
26. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-508. It is difficult to specify precisely what type of evidence will
be deemed adequate. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.10, at 804-07 (7th ed. 2004).
27. See. e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (explaining that narrow tailoring requires programs that do
"not unduly harm members of any racial group"). Significant burdens, such as losing seniority
protection in layoffs, have been held to be unconstitutional. See. e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267. See also
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court. 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture. Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66-67 (2003) (summarizing the narrow
tailoring requirements from Grutter as requiring: no undue harm of any racial group; serious, good faith
consideration of race-neutral alternatives; limitation in time; and individualized consideration).
28. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-07 (opinion of Powell, J.) (rejecting the goal of "reducing
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession" as impermissible racial balancing); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) ("Racial balance
is not to be achieved for its own sake.") (school desegregation context).
29. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 17, at 96-97 (arguing that forward looking fi-ames are "less
vulnerable to 'white innocence' challenges and claims of'nonvictim windfalls'").
30. See. e.g.. COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); Mitchell J. Chang et al.. The Educational
Benefits of Sustaining Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates, 11 J. HIGHER EDUC. 430, 449
(2006) (finding that cross racial interaction increased "openness to diversity," "cognitive development,"
and "self-confidence," as measured by self-reports).
31. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and
the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004) ("[A]ffirmative action is
increasingly being justified not as a remedy to historical discrimination and inequality, but as an
instrumentally rational strategy used to achieve the positive effects of racial and gender diversity in
modem society.").1070 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
diversity), this framing has produced some political traction.'^ In doctrinal
terms, this forward-looking frame was precisely the door left open by
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke, which emphasized that the
pedagogical benefits of a racially diverse classroom are compelling." In
Grutter, with surprising decisiveness,^" the Supreme Court preserved and
arguably expanded this forward-looking frame^' by upholding the constitu-
tionality of moderate forms of race-based affirmative action in law school
admissions.^*
However, even this limited adoption ofthe forward-looking frame has
sparked controversy. First, many are skeptical about the true pedagogical
value added by diversity in the classroom." Does it really deserve to be
called a "compelling" interest? Second, some argue that the diversity justi-
fication should operate across the intellectual and political spectra. This
would entail valuing more socially conservative, religious, and right-wing
representation in the academy.^* Conservatives proffer the fact that liberals
have not agitated for such diversity as evidence that their commitment to
"diversity" is insincere.'' Third, critics claim that forward-looking frames
have no limitation principle because one can always conjure up potential
policy benefits of a race-conscious distribution of resources. Fourth,
32. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV.
2059, 2060 (1996) (pointing out that diversity "ascribes no guilt, calls for no arguments about
compensation").
33. Sa/tite,438U.S. at3Il-12.
34. Certain lower courts had held that educational diversity was not a compelling interest. See,
e.g., Hopwood V. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled in part by Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
Also, the Supreme Court had suggested that remedying past discrimination may be the only permitted
justification for race-conscious remedies. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
35. For example, in Grutter, the majority gave great weight to the amicus briefs of former
military leaders and General Motors, which claimed that diversity produced a more effective combat
and work force. See, e.g.. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., as Amici Curiae at
7-9, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Brief of General
Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz (No. 02-516).
36. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-30, 334 (upholding the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action program as narrowly tailored to further the compelling interest of educational
diversity). But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-75 (invalidating the affirmative action program used in the
University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions).
37. For example, racial diversity probably cannot improve the way that students learn
multivariable calculus. Likewise, homogeneous firms may operate more efficiently, at least in the short
term. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1789-1802
(2003) (book review) (discussing the literature demonstrating such efficiencies).
38. See, e.g., David Horowitz, In Defense of Intellectual Diversity, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC,
Feb. 13, 2004, at B12, available a/http://chronicle.coni/free/v50/i23/23b01201.htm (suggesting that his
Academic Bill of Rights would promote intellectual diversity).
39. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Walt: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 930 (1996) (suggesting that for those who support affirmative action on
backward-looking grounds, "the diversity fig leaf exists as a pretext"); James Lindgren,
Conceptualizing Diversity in Empirical Terms, li YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 5 (2005) (reporting
comments by Harvard Law Professor Randall Kennedy that "No one really believes in diversity.").2006] FAIR MEASURES 1071
general anxiety pervades the strategy of transforming race or gender into a
qualification."" In the end, many Americans seem unpersuaded by argu-
ments about past wrongs'" or promises about fliture value (often discon-
nected ft-om the problem of discrimination)."^ This raises the question: how
does behavioral realism alter the frame?
B. Behavioral Realism: Here and Now
Most fundamental is the pervasive, replicable, and sometimes large
effects of implicit bias in the here and now."^ Implicit biases are not merely
an academic concern, although their discovery has shaped new theories of
mental processes."" Implicit bias has consequences in the daily activities of
our lives. Indeed, on socially sensitive matters such as discrimination, im-
plicit bias scores have greater predictive validity than explicit self-reports."'
The assumption is that individuals are not necessarily withholding their
"true" attitudes and beliefs but rather that they are unable to know the con-
tents of their mind.
To parse the policy implications of this science we must examine the
magnitude of bias (how big is it?), its pervasiveness (how many people
does it affect?), and its ability to predict real-world behavior (is the bias
merely some strength of association in the mind that remains there?).
40. See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 31, at 722 ("[Instrumental affirmative action] has
allowed some forms of diversity to prosper, but in the process, it has weakened the legitimacy of
affirmative action to remedy historic discrimination against those most in need. Most importantly,
instrumental affirmative action may limit opportunities for minorities in ways that remedial affirmative
action does not."). As Frymer and Skrentny point out, the District Court in Patrolmen's Benevolent
Ass'n V. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) upheld the use of race-specific hiring
of police officers to prevent racial unrest, after the brutal abuse of Abner Louima by New York police
officers. In this case, however. Black police officers complained that they were consistently assigned to
lower status jobs and exposed to greater danger. See id. at 335-36.
41. This characterization is descriptive, not normative. The present consequences of past wrongs
are enormous. And, we believe it reasonable for American society to act on its moral obligation to
respond to these consequences aggressively. See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 21, at 733
(arguing that current disparities between Black and White populations were "proximately caused" by
the racism ofthe past).
42. Forward looking justifications are not always so disconnected. For example, much of the
rhetoric in Grutter strayed beyond the pedagogical benefit of diversity and emphasized diversity's
value in creating a well-integrated society that functioned with less discrimination and also appeared as
doing so. See infra text accompanying notes 244-245.
43. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5 at 953-58, 961-62. Implicit bias is a scientific term of
art. It refers to the displacement of response along some judgment dimension caused by implicit
attitudes or implicit stereotypes. See id at . Although implicit bias can be measured in many different
ways, a principal technique is to measure the differences in speed of response between alternative
pairings of social categories on the one hand and attitudinal valences or stereotypical traits on the other.
Implicit and explicit bias cause changes in behavior, which we call discrimination. As already
explained, that discrimination may be warranted or unwarranted, legal or illegal. See supra note 15
(defining discrimination).
44. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING 117 (Henry L. Roediger et. al. eds., 2001).
45. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5 at 954 (referencing Poehlman).1072 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
Recently, a public website that administers the implicit association test
(IAT)"^ has accumulated a large database of well over three million tests,
which now provide an answer to the first two questions."^ For instance, by
a conservative estimate, around ninety percent of Americans (and others in
the western world), mentally associate negative concepts with the social
group "elderly"; only about ten percent show the opposite effect associat-
ing elderly with positive concepts. Seventy-five percent of Whites (and
fifty percent of Blacks) show anti-Black bias, and seventy-five percent of
men and women do not associate female with career as easily as they asso-
ciate female to family. These results contrast sharply with the views ex-
pressed on explicit surveys."* These data, as well as the findings in dozens
of experiments that meet the criteria of replicability and peer-review, dem-
onstrate that we are not color or gender blind, and perhaps that we cannot
be.
Of course, these implicit associations in our minds may lack any be-
havioral manifestations. However, the recent predictive validity meta-
analysis by Andrew Poehlman, Eric Uhlmann, Anthony Greenwald, and
46. For a description of the IAT, see id. at 952-53. The IAT has been and continues to be studied
very carefully. "Importantly, it has been shown that IAT measures are internally consistent, not
confounded by participants' overall speed, right or left handedness, or familiarity with IAT stimuli, and
are relatively insensitive to methodological factors like the number of target stimuli and trials and the
interval between the target stimuli and required response." T. Andrew Poehlman et. al.. Understanding
and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity 5 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors), (internal citations omitted) To get a rough sense of the rise in
influence ofthe IAT, we searched the Psychlnfo database for "implicit association test." In 1998, we
found only three records; in 1999, seven records; in 2000, eighteen records; in 2001, seventy-one
records; in 2002, eighty records; in 2003, 140 records; in 2004, 187 records; and as of Dec. 14,2005, in
2005, 135 records.
47. The data are reported in Greenwald's contribution to this Symposium. Greenwald & Krieger,
supra note 5 at 957-58. See also Brian A. Nosek et. al.. Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs
from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (reporting findings from a
dataset with N = 192,364). The dataset was created through volunteers completing a test on the
Intemet, which is not a random sample. However, this sample was far more demographically diverse
than the laboratory samples traditionally drawn from college psychology students. Furthermore, the
results can be compared against more traditional laboratory data. See id.\ see also Robert Kraut et. al..
Psychological Research Online: Report of Board ofScientiftc Affairs' Advisory Group on the Conduct
of Research on the Internet, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 105, 106 (2004) (arguing that an advantage of
Intemet research is the ability to produce "a large, diverse sample at low cost" and citing the collection
of "over 2.5 million responses in tests of implicit attitudes and beliefs" as an example; Nosek et al.,
supra, at 104 (addressing other caveats).
48. From their large Intemet dataset, Brian Nosek and colleagues found "implicit biases were
notably stronger than their explicit counterparts and were sometimes in contradiction to them." Nosek
et. al., supra note 47, at 111. For example, explicit measures showed White respondents had a
preference for Whites over Blacks, and Black respondents had a strong preference for Blacks over
Whites. But on implicit measures White respondents demonstrated a strong preference for Whites over
Blacks, and Black respondents had a weak preference for Whites over Blacks. Id. at 105; see also
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5 at.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1073
Mahzarin R. Banaji"' indicates that implicit bias correlates with real-world
behavior.^" In this study, the researchers analyzed a total of 224 IAT-
behavior correlations, generated from sixty-nine statistically independent
samples, drawn from twenty-one peer-reviewed published studies and
thirty-one unpublished studies.'' They found that implicit biases correlated
with real-world behaviors like being friendly toward a target, allocating
resources to minority organizations, and evaluating job candidates
(weighted mean correlation r = 0.25,;? = 10"^')." In other words, those who
show a larger bias on the IAT also discriminate more in their behavior."
Jeff Rachlinski, et al., cautions that many of the behavioral measures
that were correlated were intermediary steps to some final decision.''' In
other words, even if high implicit bias correlates with stiff body language,
that does not necessarily demonstrate disparate treatment in the final selec-
tion. Still, influencing intermediary steps likely produces different end-
results, at least in close cases." Also, we point out that correlations have
been found between implicit bias and ultimate decisions, such as hiring
recommendations'* and frinding decisions." In research produced since the
meta-analysis, additional correlations between implicit bias and ultimate
decisions have been found.
For example, Jonathan Ziegert and Paul Hanges had participants act
as managers instructed to evaluate job candidates based on paper
49. See Poehlman, supra note 46. For an explanation of what a meta-analysis is and its
substantial benefits, see R. Rosenthal & M.R. DiMatteo, Meta-Analysis: Recent Developments in
Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 59 (2001).
50. The researchers defined "behavioral measure" as "any measure of a physical action,
judgment, decision or physiological reaction." Poehlman, supra note 46, at 5.
51. This was the entire universe of relevant studies that the researchers could locate through
research in the Psyclnfo database, Google, and email contact with a social psychology mailing list
asking for unpublished and in press studies as of June 20, 2003. See id. By considering both published
and unpublished studies, the researchers could check whether there was some publication bias that
favored large effect sizes. To the contrary, the r values were higher in the unpublished studies (r = .29)
as compared to the published ones (r = .21).
52. Table 1 provides a list of the behaviors with which IAT measures have been found to
correlate.
53. For an application of ISC to managerial decision making, see Mahzarin R. Banaji et. al.. How
(Un)ethical Are You?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at 3; Max H. Bazerman et. al.. When Good People
(Seem to) Negotiate in Bad Faith, NEGOTIATION (Harv. Bus. Sch. Publ'g, Boston, Mass.), Oct. 2005, at
1.
54. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ct al.. Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges? (manuscript on
file with author) (cited with permission).
55. For a more detailed explanation of the positive feedback loops in awkward body language
that lead to worse interviews "on the merits," see Kang, supra note 12, at 1524-25.
56. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash
Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 743, 757 (2001). In this experiment, in one condition, a
gender IAT correlated with a hireability index computed on the basis of survey responses to three
questions: "that (1) they would interview the applicant for the job, (2) they would personally hire the
applicant for the job, and (3) the applicant would be hired for the job." Id. at 751 -52.
57. See Laurie Rudman et al.. Minority Member's Implicit Stereotypes and Attitudes
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).1074 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
dossiers.'^ The dossiers were designed to be comparable in quality, with
race (Black or White) randomly assigned. In a hiring condition in which
the president of the firm signaled his preference for a White hire,'' implicit
bias correlated significantly with disparate evaluations. When no such
preference was expressed, there was no correlation. This suggests that the
institutional environment influences whether implicit biases are behavior-
ally manifested.^"
Skeptics may question the external validity of laboratory-based stud-
ies*' where the respondents are typically college psychology students who
may neither take the experiments seriously nor consider fUlly the conse-
quences of their actions. But consider a recent study conducted by Alexan-
der Green, Dana Carney, and Mahzarin R. Banaji, which examined how
medical interns made diagnoses as a function of race.*^^ Two hundred and
ninety-one medical interns in the Boston and Atlanta metropolitan areas
were randomly assigned to view, read symptom profiles, and make diagno-
sis and treatment recommendations for a hypothetical Black or White pa-
tient. Consistent with the prevalence of coronary artery disease (CAD) in
Black and White Americans, Black patients were more likely to be diag-
nosed with CAD than White patients.
However, treatment with state of the art Thrombolytic Therapy was
given equally to both Black and White patients thereby creating a greater
discrepancy between diagnosis and treatment for Black than White pa-
tients. The most highly biased medical interns as measured by the IAT
were also more likely to treat White patients with Thrombolytic Therapy,
despite their own diagnoses of Black Americans' higher likelihood of
CAD. The greater disparity between diagnosis and treatment for Blacks
relative to Whites was best accounted for by a path model showing that
IAT bias led to a stereotype that Blacks were stubborn and noncompliant
and therefore likely to refuse treatment. In sum, even when the participants
58. See Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit
Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 556 (2005).
59. The president's memo asked the manager to consider education and experience. But in the
"racial bias" condition, the memo included the following paragraph: "Given that the vast majority of
our workforce is White, it is essential we put a White person in the VP position. I do not want to
jeopardize the fine relationship we have with our people in the units. Betty (the outgoing vice
president) worked long and hard to get those folks to trust us, and I do not want her replacement to
have to overcome any personal barriers." Id. at 558. This manipulation seems unrealistic because such
preferences are no longer written down; that said, the outlandishness of the request should have worked
against finding any behavioral correlation.
60. See id. at 559, 56\.
61. For a defense of laboratory experimentation as the tool for secure generalizations, see
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Robert G. Crowder, The Bankruptcy of Everyday Memory 45 AM
Psychologist. 1185(1989).
62. Alexander Green, Dana Carney & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Measuring Physicians' Implicit
Biases: A New Approach To Studying Root Causes Of Racial/Ethnic Disparities In Health Care
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1075
(doctors) were making recommendations in a serious context and were ar-
guably subject to strong demand effects to demonstrate that they were co-
lorblind, they still engaged in disparate treatment that correlated with their
implicit biases.
This empirical demonstration of implicit bias and its consequences
enables a new temporal framing for affirmative action not based on the past
or fiiture, but the present. This presentist framing—to borrow Kathleen
Sullivan's words—does not deny that the past is in need of "redemption."*^
Nor does it deny the benefits of diversity, which experiments in social cog-
nition can help identify and measure. It does, however, foreground the evi-
dence of widespread implicit bias here and now.
A presentist framing avoids the temporal problems of a backward-
looking frame. The passage of time disrupts chains of causality and weak-
ens both moral and legal claims for correction.*^ But the presentist ap-
proach does not look to the past. It also does not highlight "institutional
racism," which skeptics refute as unfalsifiable and as merely some regret-
table but not unjust disparate impact inevitable in market competition. In-
stead, it points to mechanisms of bias as produced by the current, ordinary
workings of human brains—the mental states they create, the schemas they
hold, and the behaviors they produce. Obviously, both history and societal
factors play a crucial role in providing the content of those schemas, which
are programmed through culture, media, and the material context.*^ But the
presentist approach does not rely on some amorphous racism brooding "out
there"; it focuses instead on the bias measurable within individuals.**
A presentist framing also avoids problems with forward-looking "di-
versity" justifications of affirmative action. These justifications were po-
litically attractive—arguably necessary—^because we, as a society, lost
political consensus on the magnitude of bias and discrimination that per-
sisted. With evidence from ISC, the forward-looking frame becomes op-
tional. We do not need to argue about the empirical benefits of diversity—
63. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 98.
64. Richard Epstein calls this a "wasting asset" with a "built-in time fuse." Richard A. Epstein, A
Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky But Classical Liberal Defense, 100 U. MICH. L. REV.
2036, 2039 (2002). For arguments why past inequalities continue to manifest themselves today, see,
e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23-30 (2002) (discussing self-reinforcing
stereotypes); Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action,
82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117-22 (2002) (applying lock-in theory to explain the inequalities between
Blacks and Whites in education, housing, and employment markets); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to
Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 743-48 (2000) (providing
overview of lock-in theory, drawing on antitrust law and concepts).
65. There is little reason to think that racial schemas are significantly hardwired. See, e.g., Kang,
supra note 12, at 1531-35 (responding to "correction is impossible" objection); Andreas Olsson et al..
The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 SCIENCE 785, 787 (2005) (rejecting
simplistic evolutionary biology story).
66. See Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12 (discussing
"thumbprint of the culture on our minds") (quoting Mahzarin R. Banaji).1076 CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
although we cati. We do not need to explain why such real-world benefits
trump the supposed moral or constitutional imperative of colorblindness—
although we can. Instead, by detnonstrating discrimination now, this fire
can be fought with narrowly tailored fire. Put another way, color coti-
sciousness in the form of pervasive implicit bias is what requires color con-
sciousness in the form of prevention and remedies.
This reframing has political implications. It speaks to the many
Americans who are willing to adopt fair measures that take race and gender
explicitly into account only to stop and prevent unwarranted discrimination
on the basis of those very attributes. This reframing also has doctrinal con-
sequences, on both the compelling interest and narrow tailoring prongs of
an equal protection analysis. For example, Grutter held that educational
diversity was constitutionally compelling. We do not know, however,
whether a new Supreme Court will trim this finding or expand it beyond
the domain of higher learning.*' Regardless, it is indisputable that respond-
ing to discrimination is a compelling interest not limited solely to the field
of education.**
We make two clarifications. First, responding to discrimination should
be a constitutionally compelling interest regardless of whether explicit or
implicit bias actuates the discrimination.*' Those who argue otherwise must
confront the science that demonstrates the existence and real-world conse-
quences of implicit bias. Given this evidence, they bear the burden to show
why these harms, whether they be couched in terms of inefficiency or un-
fairness, should be categorically disregarded simply because their causes
operate beneath our self-awareness.™ Ignorance is not always a defense.
67. Grutter invites a broader reading that goes beyond just the field of education and into the
forward-looking benefits of a diversified elite in the military as well as the business worlds. See. e.g.,
Karst, supra note 19, at 60-61, 67. Justice Scalia publicly fretted over just this fate. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that diversity might be used in employment context).
Post-Grutter, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge Richard Posner, held that a diversified
police force was a compelling interest. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F 3d 1111 1114-15 (7th Cir
2003).
68. We focus on constitutional arguments in the body of the text. But there are statutory
implications too, for example in the application of Title VII ofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act. As described
in greater detail infra text accompanying note 255, Title VII may not tolerate voluntary race-conscious
strategies justified on forward-looking "diversity" goals. In sharp contrast, a presentist goal of stopping
discrimination is compatible with the purpose of Title VII. Again, the reframing makes a tangible
difference.
69. In the Title VII context, we think that responding to discrimination is consistent with the
statute regardless of whether explicit or implicit bias drives the behavior. There is some case law
support for this position. See. e.g.. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988)
(noting unconscious bias being a problem even if intentional discrimination is not occurring);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.").
70. It would be as if bruises from an easy-to-see punch should be legally cognizable, but cancer
from hard-to-see benzene exposure must be categorically ignored. We understand that in a tort case, the
former is easier to prove than the latter. But that hardly means that society should not have laws and
policies that forbid benzene dumping or decrease its unnecessary production.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1077
We are not arguing that discrimination caused by implicit bias should be
equally problematic as that caused by consciously endorsed explicit bias.
Even though the latter is more offensive to equality, responding to the for-
mer remains a compelling interest. Second, given our presentist reframing,
responding to discrimination means not only remedying present acts of
discrimination but also preventing discrimination that is likely to occur
without some proactive action.^' Indeed, this is one of the original mean-
ings of "affirmative action.'"^ In sum, preventing (not only remedying)
discrimination caused by implicit (not only explicit) bias should be consid-
ered a compelling interest.
To this conclusion, we incorporate the arguments made by Ian Ayres
and Frederick Vars, that public actors can adopt affirmative action in a
specific market in order to remedy private discrimination within that same
market." Drawing on Croson,''* they argue persuasively'^ that the state is
not artificially constrained to combat the bias solely of its own employees
and agents. Instead, the state can adopt narrowly tailored measures that
provide better treatment in the public sector to counter the worse treatment
in the private market.''^ With this addition, we reach the following doctrinal
conclusion: The state's preventing discrimination by itself or remedying
discrimination by certain delimited private actors" is a constitutionally
compelling interest regardless of whether the discrimination is caused by
explicit or implicit bias.
We are not arguing that implicit bias-induced discrimination should
produce the same legal liability as explicit animus-driven discrimination
under current equal protection doctrine or federal antidiscrimination stat-
utes. That question rests beyond our project. Instead, our legal analysis
71. Michael Yelnosky has persuasively argued that the preventative justification for voluntary
affirmative action is in accord with Title VII. See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for
Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (2003).
72. See William W. Van Alstyne, Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1517, 1527-29 (2000)
(explaining that Executive Order 11246, issued under the Presidential administrations of Kennedy and
Johnson, was directed at federal contractors and consisted of "precautionary and preventive measures"
because of the "concem that were they not taken, some racial discrimination might otherwise occur").
73. See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public
Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1581 (1998). Ayres and Vars provide the example ofa
city engaging in affirmative action for minority-owned subcontractors because of clear evidence that
private contractors discriminate against minority subcontractors. See id. See also Kenneth L. Karst,
Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 44
(noting Justice O'Connor in Croson "ma[dc] clear that [a] city can accept its share of the public
responsibility for remedying private discrimination, [by] using its spending powers to remedy
discrimination in the local construction industry).
74. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) (a state "has the
authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction").
75. We do not undertake any separate defense of their argument. Also, this addition is fully
severable from the arguments we have made up to now.
76. SeeAyres&Vars,™pranote73, at 1611-19.
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considers only whether courts should deem a voluntary adoption of a fair
measure that counters implicit bias-induced discrimination to be a
"compelling interest" when opponents legally challenge the measure.
Now that we have discussed the compelling interest prong, we shift to
the narrow tailoring discussion. Courts have rejected the backward-looking
goal of remedying general societal discrimination partly because of the
difficulty of narrowly tailoring any response to such an immense and per-
vasive problem.^^ Similar concerns about narrow tailoring have derailed
forward-looking objectives that courts have criticized as open-ended social
engineering without adequate tethers to restrain its operations." By con-
trast, as we demonstrate throughout the paper, fair measures that target dis-
crimination now can be more objectively designed, implemented, and
delimited in scope and duration.
C. A Better Model of Discrimination
If behavioral realism reorients us to consider discrimination here and
now, one might reasonably ask why standard antidiscrimination law does
not suffice? In other words, if the compelling interest is to prevent dis-
crimination, why do we need fair measures beyond antidiscrimination
laws?
Linda Hamilton Krieger ably addressed these questions,*" so we add
only a few points. Lawmakers developed traditional antidiscrimination law
in ignorance of ISC generally and implicit bias specifically. The basic com-
ponents of traditional antidiscrimination law are (1) ex ante commands not
to discriminate, and (2) ex post legal remedies if plaintiffs prove discrimi-
nation. Under many of these laws, such as equal protection or disparate
78. .See, e.g.. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (expressing
anxiety over harming innocent third parties); see also supra text accompanying note 24.
79. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (Powell, J.) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he role model theory ... has no logical stopping point. The role model theory allows the
Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any
legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the required percentage of minority teachers to the
percentage of minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year calibration the Court stated was
unnecessary "). To be sure, the Court recently upheld the narrowly tailored affirmative action
program at the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). But
in doing so, the Court substantially altered what narrow tailoring had come to mean. For a sharp
critique of how Grutter and Gratz confused the "narrow tailoring" requirements by replacing a
"minimum necessary preference" requirement with a fuzzy "individualized consideration" requirement,
see Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz (Yale
Olin Paper No. 287, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=l030&context=yale/lepp.
80. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1276-1329 (1998); see also Deana A. Pollard,
Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment
Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 926-37 (1999) (noting that prejudiced responses are
largely unconscious, but antidiscrimination legislation requires a showing of intent to discriminate to
obtain relief in most circumstances).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1079
treatment, the ex ante command refers to intentional discrimination—
purposefully different treatment of individuals because of their group
membership. But such an explicit ex ante exhortation not to be intention-
ally unfair will do little to counter implicit cognitive processes, which take
place outside our awareness yet influence our behavior.*'
Ex post rights to sue have additional difficulties that can render them
useless in the face of discrimination caused by implicit bias. Most obvi-
ously, they require the victim to perceive the discrimination. When the
harm is invisible to the victim, talk of ex post remedies becomes moot. For
various psychological reasons, invisibility runs deep. First, individuals tend
to think that they are exceptional in that even though other members of
their social category suffer from discrimination, they believe that they have
gotten off relatively easy.*^ Second, when exposed to data on a case-by-
case basis as compared to a big picture summary, individuals do poorly in
spotting discrimination.*^ Third, through system justification motives, as
explained by Gary Blasi and John Jost in this Symposium, the victim may
see her fate as normal and deserved.*"* Fourth, even when a victim suspects
discrimination, high transaction costs and difficult evidentiary burdens
make litigation unlikely.*^
A model that supposes that discrimination takes place explicitly,
through a rational cost-benefit analysis or other expression of explicitly
held views has become woefully out-of-date. A behavioral realist analysis
has demonstrated that such a model of explicit discrimination is not up to
81. Michael Selmi has already made this point, drawing on an older body of scientific evidence
of unconscious discrimination. See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the
Affiirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.REW. 1251, 1283(1995).
82. See Faye J. Crosby, Understanding Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
13, 24-25 (1994) (reporting studies). This is sometimes called the "personal group discrimination
dissociation" (PGDD).
83. See Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika supra note 80, at 1305-09 (summarizing studies by
Faye Crosby and Diane Cordova). Gary Blasi identifies other changes in the modem workplace, in
which "shifting networks of contracting entities" replace traditional internal labor markets of large
firms, which makes comparisons in treatment still more difficult. Gary Blasi, Default
Discrimination: Dealing with Universal Bias Draft 3.0A 2005 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors); see also supra text accompanying note 37; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) (addressing difficulties of
"innumerable daily encounters" in increasingly flat, flexible, boundaryless work arrangements).
84. See Gary Blasi and John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for
Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1136-37 (2006).
85. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. III. L.
REV. 583 (1999). Michael Yelonsky notes that "[w]hile approximately 80,000 charges are filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) each year, many employees who believe their
employer or prospective employer violated Title VII do not sue." Id at 586. He attributes low filing
rates to the fact that litigation requires plaintiffs to bear "financial, emotional, and reputational costs" in
exchange for an uncertain chance of success due to the "rigid, highly stylized burdens of pleading and
proof ofa Title VII claim. Id. at 588.1080 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
the task of responding to implicit bias, which is pervasive but diffuse, con-
sequential but unintended, ubiquitous but invisible.^*
To be fair, since Griggs v. Duke Power Co.^'' adopted a disparate im-
pact theory of Title VII, antidiscrimination law has understood the problem
of discrimination more capaciously.^* And as the Krieger and Fiske article
in this Symposium shows, even disparate treatment law could adapt to in-
corporate the new implicit cognitive learning.^' We encourage such doc-
trinal evolution. But such projects should complement, not foreclose, a
simultaneous exploration of other voluntary measures to prevent and rem-
edy worse treatment actuated by implicit bias. We should not rigidly cir-
cumscribe fair measures to the status quo's anti-discrimination law.
Instead, we need a new model of discrimination for implicit bias—one
based on a more accurate model of human cognition and emotion, espe-
cially its constraints. This new model must promote proactive structural
interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential indi-
vidual litigation.'" A public health comparison is illuminating." Public
health is not pursued simply by creating ex post individual rights of action
against those who intentionally "cause" disease. Instead, health agencies
engage in preventative structural measures. For example, underlying clean
water requirements is the notion that harmful agents, such as bacteria that
an individual can spread to an entire community, are likely to go unde-
tected by individual consumers and citizens. It is thus unreasonable to sup-
pose that individuals alone, through conscious practice, will abate the
problem. Rather, collective public health intervention is necessary. In fact,
where water safety cannot be guaranteed, we do not wait until citizens get
86. See Bagenstos, supra note 83, at 9-12 ("Recognition of the pervasiveness of implicit bias
lends support to a structural approach to antidiscrimination law.").
87. 401 U.S. 424,432(1971).
88. Many commentators have argued that disparate impact has only had a modest effect. See,
e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998 (1991) (modest impact on litigation volume); Elaine W. Shoben,
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's GHggs Still Good For? What Not?,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (modest impact even after Civil Rights Act of 1991).
89. See Krieger & Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias
and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
90. Cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 CoLUM. L. REV. 458, 460-63 (2001) (proposing structuralism, whieh is "the development of
institutions and processes to enact general norms in particular contexts," to combat second generation
employment discrimination that may be result of "cognitive or unconscious bias"). Bagenstos is,
however, pessimistic about the likelihood that a structural approach can be successfully implemented.
See Bagenstos, supra note 83. His criticisms apply, however, more forcefully to ex post lawsuits than to
ex ante, voluntary adoption of fair measures.
91. A comparison between environmental and civil rights law is also illuminating. See Tseming
Yang, The Form and Substance of EnvironmentalJustice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143 (2002). Yang points out
that civil rights law "ignores the fact that discrimination, much like environmental degradation, is an
aspect of life that is pervasive throughout society ...." Id. at 195.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1081
infected; instead, we inject a purifying agent prior to imbibing. We are
willing to take these preventative, proactive measures partly because we
recognize that these problems cannot be easily detected by individuals,
produce demonstrable harm, and reflect present concerns, not mere sedi-
ments of some distant, eccentric, pathological past. By contrast, we re-
spond differently to a truly historical problem, such as smallpox, which has
been eradicated, by lowering our guard and devoting minimal resources to
detecting recurrences.
II
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF MERIT
A. Conventional Thinking: Sacrificing Merit
Opponents decry affirmative action as a deviation from merit.
Skeptical about the degree of discrimination that persists, they see under-
representation of women and minorities as the real-world consequences of
actual merit differentials. Some opponents view these differences as simply
the state of the world, either freely chosen,'^ genetically predetermined, or
the end-result of a beneficial Social Darwinism. Other opponents seem
more troubled by the differences that result from group-based disadvan-
tage, but this concern does not alter their view that affirmative action sacri-
fices merit.
Proponents of affirmative action can adopt one of three standard re-
sponses, which we label as (a) net benefit, (b) merit as fraud, and (c) insti-
tutional mission. First, and most conservative, net benefit concedes that
affirmative action sacrifices merit but suggests that the social justice and
social stability benefits of affirmative action outweigh the efficiency
costs." This proponent of affirmative action weights the benefits and costs
differently from a utilitarian opponent of affirmative action. Of course, op-
ponents of affinnative action who view colorblindness and/or selection by
merit as moral or constitutional imperatives claim to be unwilling to en-
gage in such policy trade-offs.'"*
92. One might view a career choice that accurately reflects a person's preferences to be freely
chosen. But what if one's preferences are influenced by cultural stereotypes? For an ISC explication of
this interrelationship, see Brian A. Nosek et al., Math = Male. Me = Female. Therefore Math i^ Me, 83
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 44 (2002). The authors demonstrate how background cultural
stereotypes that math is not a female strength discourages women from wanting to study math.
93. See, e.g., Richard H. Falion, Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1913, 1930 (1996) (describing a "non-medt-based" form of affirmative action, which would
allow for some sacrifice of traditional ideas of merit for other benefits); Jerry Kang, Negative Action
Against Asian American: The Internal Instability ofDworkin 's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1, 6 (1996) (discussing Ronald Dworkin's defense of affirmative action, which
supposes a "net benefit" condition).
94. We say "claim to be," because these very same individuals will often accept color
consciousness when it comes to racial profiling in a post 9/11 world. See. e.g.. Jerry Kang, Thinking1082 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
Second, and least conservative, merit as fraud challenges prevailing
merit definitions as fundamentally biased.'^ On this view, for example,
standardized tests do not examine for anything resembling intelligence or
aptitude; rather, they merely reify past privilege.'* Those with the most re-
sources determine the nature of such tests to keep power within tradition-
ally privileged circles.'^ Even if such an effort is not conscious, it
nonetheless emphasizes a self-privileging view of merit.
Third, situated between these two extremes, institutional mission em-
phasizes the relational nature of merit: what counts as merit depends on the
goal.'^ A brilliant mathematical ability is not merit if the goal is to win a
fUll-contact cage match. This critique recasts the debate on merit as a de-
bate on institutional mission. For an institution of higher education, is the
goal to admit the most intelligent as defined as the best test takers? Or is its
mission broader, for example, including the goal of training future leaders?
If it includes the latter, then a university must seek "merit" in evidence
likely to predict a future leader, even at the expense of standardized test
scores or grades.
The rhetorical back-and-forth between these various positions on
merit is well rehearsed. What does the implicit social cognition (ISC) have
to add to this debate?
B. Behavioral Realism: Mismeasuring Merit
It is tempting to pursue a behavioral realist critique that provides evi-
dence for and explores the implications of the merit as fraud or institu-
tional mission positions. But we want to confront the hardest case for
affirmative action by accepting the status quo conception of merit.
Although we have serious reservations about this conception,'' we put
Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195, 200 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576-77 (2002).
95. See. e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER; WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 213-17 (2000) (discussing how what counts as meritorious is designed around
masculine norms); Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10 Reasons Why
UC-Davis Should Abandon ihe LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C.
DAVISL. REV. 593(2001).
96. See. e.g., Roithmayr, supra note 64, at 734.
97. See. e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 1449(1997).
98. See. e.g., Kang, supra note 93, at 8; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future Of Affirmative
Action: Reclaiming The Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 968-69 (1996) (embracing the idea of
"functional merit" rather than merit as a concept of desert); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz,
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 965 (1974) (defining merit as that which
satisfies social needs).
99. See. e.g., Faye J. Crosby, et al.. Affirmative Action: Psychological Data and the Policy
Debates, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 93, 100 (2003) (pointing out how weakly the SAT predicts
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them aside and probe what ISC has to say about how we conventionally
measure merit.
1. Perceiver Effects
The mind does its work silently. One does not hear whirring as
thought processes change gear, or the sound of draining as information is
lost. Nor does one receive a printout of errors at the end ofthe day. But the
human atfribute of self-consciousness, which includes the ability to refiect
on the contents of one's own mind, gives the illusion of access and con-
trol.'"" "I know what I know, I know what I believe, I can change what I
think"—these may be true of our self-consciously endorsed attitudes and
beliefs, but this refiects only a fraction ofthe work our minds do.
Implicit cognitive processes infiuence how we, as perceivers, judge
others. There is now overwhelming evidence that mental constructs that are
cognitively accessible influence how the perceiver evaluates and judges
others. The standard experiments evincing this phenomenon trigger a par-
ticular construct, then require the participant to evaluate some person's ac-
tion. For example, researchers ask participants to read passages designed to
activate particular personality qualities, such as "stubborn" or "persistent,"
then instruct them to evaluate ambiguous target behavior. When partici-
pants do so, their evaluations are biased in accordance with the activated
knowledge.'*" This phenomenon has been demonstrated over myriad do-
mains, such as: wanting to work with a gay person;'"^ judging alcoholics;'"-'
interpreting aggressive behavior;'"'' and treating women in sexist ways.'"^
Significantly, the mental constructs that guide our evaluations include
beliefs (stereotypes) and feelings (prejudice) about entire social categories.
100. See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2003).
101. See Constantine Sedikides & John J. Skowronski, Towards Reconciling Personality and
Social Psychology: A Construct Accessibility Approach, 5 J. Soc. BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 531, 534-
36 (1990) (discussing studies that show that subjects have a bias in favor of interpreting ambiguous
target behavior in accordance with information (or constructs) accessible, both chronically (as with
stereotypes) or momentarily (as primed and activated by researchers)).
102. See James Johnson et al.. Construct Accessibility. AIDS, and Judgment, 9 J. Soc. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 191, 195-98 (1994) (demonstrating that subjects primed with information negatively
associating gays with AIDS reported a lower desire to work with the target, a gay job applicant).
103. See Lillian Southwick, Claude Steeie & Michael Lindell, The Roles of Historical Experience
and Construct Accessibility in Judgments About Alcoholism, 10 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 167, 182
(1986) (showing that an "alcoholic" prime prompted more construct-consistent judgments than actual
familial or friendship experience with an alcoholic).
104. See Sandra Graham & Cynthia Hudley, Attributions of Aggressive and Nonaggressive
African-American Male Early Adolescents: A Study of Construct Accessibility, 30 DEV. PSYCHOL. 365,
369-71 (1994) (showing that for non-aggressive children, priming to perceive negative events as
intentionally caused produces more extreme responses).
105. See Laurie A. Rudman & Eugene Borgida, The Afterglow of Construct Accessibility: The
Behavioral Consequences of Priming Men to View Women as Sexual Objects, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 493, 511-13 (1995) (priming perceivers to categorize women as sexual objects resulted
in more sexist behavior toward female targets compared to unprimed perceivers).1084 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
Unconscious stereotypes, rooted in social categorization, are ubiquitous
and chronically accessible.'"* They are automatically prompted by the mere
presence of a target mapped into a particular social category.'"^ Thus, when
we see a Black (or a White) person, the attitude and stereotypes associated
with that racial category automatically activate. Further, these attitudes and
stereotypes influence our judgments,'"* as well as inhibit countertypical
associations.'"'
106. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364 (D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske & G. Lindzey eds., 1998) (discussing studies
showing that prejudice and stereotypes can be learned and operate unconsciously).
107. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 136, 140-
41 (1996) (showing gender information primed through words produced faster (automatic) responses to
targets with stereotypical gender roles (e.g., doctor-he) than counterstereotypic prime-target gender
pairs (e.g., nurse-he)); Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1147-48 (1996) (showing that gender
stereotype priming resulted in faster target responses to gender-stereotypic prime-target pairs (e.g.,
gentle-Jane) than counterstereotypic trials (e.g., strong-Jane), arguing that stereotypes may be
automatically activated through a priming procedure); Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A
Continuum of Impression Formation, From Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of
Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 4, 23-24 (M.P. Zanna ed., 1990) (discussing studies showing that initial
categorization occurs immediately upon receiving information relevant to a meaningful social category
(e.g., cognitive stereotyping)); Thomas E. Ford et al.. Influence of Social Category Accessibility and
Category-Associated Trait Accessibility on Judgments of Individuals, 12 Soc. COGNITION 149, 163-164
(1994) (showing that priming a narrowly defined social category activates judgments consistent with
the primed category); David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 40-42 (R.S. Wyer, Jr. & T.K. Srull eds., 1994) (discussing studies demonstrating
the automaticity of stereotyping); Charles W. Perdue et al., "Us" and "Them": Social Categorization
and the Process of Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 475, 478-79, 482-84 (1990)
(showing the use of words describing the in-group (e.g., us) resulted in faster and positive affective
associations to unfamiliar targets, compared to words describing out-group status (e.g., them)).
108. See John F. Dovidio et al.. Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive
Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 32-33 (1986) (showing that participants
responded faster to the activation of traits stereotypic of the prime category (e.g.. White persons are
ambitious) compared to traits counterstereotypic of the prime category (e.g.. White persons are
musical)); Jack A. Glaser & Mahzarin R. Banaji, When Fair Is Foul and Foul Is Fair: Reverse Priming
in Automatic Evaluation, 11 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 669, 671 (1999) (showing when race-
neutral primes were used, congruent prime-targets pairs (e.g., negative-black and positive-white)
exhibited slower results than incongruent pairs (e.g., positive-black and negative-white)); Lorella
Lepore & Rupert Brown, Category and Stereotype Activation: Is Prejudice Inevitable?, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 275, 281-82 (1997) (showing that despite common stereotype
knowledge, high-prejudiced participants formed a more negative impression of the target person after
subliminal priming of the category "Blacks" than participants in the non-condition, while low-
prejudiced participants formed the opposite impressions); William Von Hippel et al.. The Linguistic
Intergroup Bias As an Implicit Indicator of Prejudice, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 507
(1997) (showing that a subject's implicit prejudice towards African-Americans resulted in differential
responses to African-American and Caucasian targets).
109. See Ad van Knippenbcrg & Ap Dijksterhuis, A Posteriori Stereotype Activation: The
Preservation of Stereotypes Through Memory Distortion, 14 Soc. COGNITION 21, 46-48 (1996)
(showing that stereotype activation inhibits and weakens the ability of perceivers to recall stereotype-
inconsistent behavior); Yaacov Trope & Erik P. Thompson, Looking For Truth in All the Wrong
Places? Asymmetric Search of Individuating Information About Stereotyped Group Members, 73 J.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1085
As applied to race, Jerry Kang has labeled this process as a sort of
"racial mechanics.""" An individual (target) is mapped into a social cate-
gory in accordance with prevailing legal and cultural mapping rules. Once
mapped, the category activates various meanings, which include cognitive
and affective associations that may be partly hard-wired but are mostly cul-
turally-conditioned. These activated meanings then alter the interaction
between perceiver and target. These mechanics occur automatically, with-
out effort or conscious awareness on the part ofthe perceiver.'" Although
perceivers assume that their judgments are based "on the merits"— in other
words on the basis of qualities that the target in fact exhibits—the truth is
more complicated. Even if we lack animus, intention to discriminate, or
self-awareness of bias, our judgments of others may still lack "mental due
process.""^ On subjective measures of merit, the perceiver's (evaluator's)
expectations guide what she actually sees in the target (the person being
evaluated). In more plain language, if we expect someone to be violent, we
will likely see violence when presented with ambiguous behavior."^
From the vantage point of social psychology, these cognitive proc-
esses are old news. Even in the law reviews, Linda Hamilton Krieger set
PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL. 229, 235 (1997) (showing that participants asked fewer individuating
questions of stereotyped targets than non-stereotyped targets).
110, See generally Kang, supra note 12, at 1497-1506. At least as applied to race, these mechanics
are largely socially constructed. In other words, the recognition of particular races, the legal and
cultural rules by which we map individual human beings into racial categories, and the meanings (both
attitudes and stereotypes) associated with these categories are all principally products of human culture
and institutions. See id. at 1501-02.
111. Scores of studies demonstrate that subliminal priming can alter the ways we interpret
ambiguous behavior. See, e.g., John A, Bargh et al,, Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of
Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 11 J, PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 230, 236-38
(1996) (demonstrating that indirect exposure to words associated with the elderly altered the speed of
walking down a hallway); Patricia G, Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J, PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 5, 11-12 (1989) (demonstrating that
subliminal primitig with words stereotypically associated with Blacks can cause perceivers to evaluate
ambiguous behavior as more "aggressive"); John F, Dovidio et al,. On the Nature of
Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC, PSYCHOL, 510, 516-17
(1997) (demonstrating that subliminal flashes of Black or White faces can produce time differentials in
classifyitig positive or negative words),
112, Mahzariti R, Banaji & R, Bhaskar, Implicit Stereotypes and Memory: The Bounded
Rationality of Social Beliefs, in MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF 139-175 (D, L. Schacter & E, Scarry,
eds,, 2000).
113. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J, PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 590
(1976) (showing that the race of a "shover" in a video altered whether a "shove" was deemed
aggressive). If the shover was Black and the victim was White, 75% of the perceivers characterized it
as aggressive; by contrast, if the shover was White and the victim was Black, only 17% of the
perceivers thought it aggressive, ld. at 595. See also H, Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial
and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J,
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL, 590, 593-95 (1980) (showing that the darkness ofthe skin of drawn
characters altered whether a hallway bump in an ambiguous narrative was viewed as hostile by both
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out much of this science back in 1995"" and 1998."^ What is new, how-
ever, is an updating of the empirical evidence for such biased evaluation.
We have already described the evidence of predictive validity, as provided
by the meta-analysis by Poehlman, et al."* Many of the studies included in
that analysis addressed behavioral consequences in judging or evaluating
others' merit."^ For example, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has
been correlated with biased evaluations of job candidates. Laurie Rudman
and Peter Glick have demonstrated that negative evaluations of agentic
(self-promoting, highly competent) women relative to identically character-
ized men correlated with IAT scores but not to explicit self-reports about
belief in gender stereotypes."*
2. Target Effects
It is fairly easy to see how subjective evaluations can be biased, but
what about completely objective measures, such as standardized multiple
choice tests? Numerous commentators have challenged these tests as insuf-
ficiently validated; in other words, there is little evidence that the tests ac-
tually "test" for the right set of characteristics that are functionally
necessary for a particular task."' But we tackle a harder question.
114. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (arguing that a
large number of biased employment decisions result from a variety of unintentional categorization-
related judgment errors characterizing normal human cognitive functioning).
115. See, e.g., Kreiger, supra note 80, at 1268-69 (describing psychological processes, such as
selective memory and expectancy-confirmation that could lead to schema-consistent interpretations).
116. Poehlman et al., supra note 46; see also Dolly Chugh, Societal and Managerial Implications
of Implicit Social Cognition: Why Milliseconds Matter, 17 Soc. JUSTICE RES. 203 (2004) (reviewing
scientific evidence of predictive validity relevant to the work that managers do). Chugh emphasizes that
managers work in a frenetic mode, with half of their activities lasting less than nine minutes and ninety-
three percent of their verbal contact being ad hoc, not pre-planned. Id. at 205. If time, concentration,
and effort are necessary to prevent implicit bias from influencing behaviors, managers do not seem to
have such resources aplenty in their daily worklife.
117. Back in 1999, Amy Wax argued that the data were simply not available on type of bias,
magnitude, and consequence. See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
Although that may have been true then, it is no longer the case now. For a trenchant, contemporaneous
critique to Wax's paper, see Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discrimination as
Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999).
118. See Rudman & Glick, supra note 56, at 747-48.
119. See, e.g., Sturm & Guinier, supra note 98, at 969-80. Robert Stemberg has identified three
components to "successful intelligence": the ability to think "analytically, creatively, and practically."
ROBERT J. STERNBERG, SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE 127 (1996). Because "only analytical intelligence
is valued on tests and in the classroom" such measures are often inaccurate indicators of how well one
will perform in advance schooling or in a career. Id. at 127, 127-37; see also Howard Gardner,
Cracking Open the IQ Box, in THE BELL CURVE WARS 23, 29 (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (noting the
increase in "performance examinations" because standardized tests focus solely on important, but
overly narrow aspects of intelligence); Robert J. Stemberg & Wendy M. Williams, Does the Graduate
Record Examination Predict Meaningful Success in the Graduate Training of Psychologists?, 52 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST. 630, 636-37 (1997) (demonstrating that GRE test scores modestly predicted first-year
grades, but failed to predict second-year grades, and that the GRE Analytical test score predicted the2006] FAIR MEASURES 1087
Suppose that a test does in fact measure the correct characteristics.
Even so, implicit cognitive processes within the test-taker can produce dif-
ferences in test performance, as a function of arbitrary environmental cues.
They can do so in part by altering how the perceiver thinks about herself,
which can substantially hamper (and sometimes improve) performance.'^"
Such studies raise fundamental questions. To what extent is the measure
predictive if it "moves" with trivial interventions such as reminding people
of their social group?'^' We focus on the "stereotype threat" literature,
which has received serious attention from scientists, the public, and even
the Educational Testing Service'^^ whose very existence rests on the gen-
eral public's confidence in its standardized tests.
Individuals who belong to social groups marked by negative stereo-
types about intellectual perfonnance underperform when cues remind them
of their group identity. In their seminal experiment, Claude Steeie and
Joshua Aronson gave a difficult verbal test to White and Black under-
graduate students. One group was told that the test measured how smart
they were. Another comparable group was told that the (identical) test was
simply a laboratory exercise. In the latter condition, the Black students per-
formed as well as the White students, controlling for the participants' ini-
tial skills. But in the former condition. Black students greatly
underperformed equally skilled White students.'" As the authors ex-
plain: "[T]he existence of a negative stereotype about a group to which one
"ratings of analytical, creative, practical, research, and teaching abilities by primary advisers and
ratings of dissertation quality by faculty readers" for men but not for women). Many scholars and
scientists challenged the validity of standardized testing in response to the controversial book, the THE
BELL CURVE. See. e.g.. THE BELL CURVE DEBATE (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995);
CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET. AL.. INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH (1996);
INTELLIGENCE, GENES, AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND TO THE BELL CURVE (Bemie Devlin et. al.
eds., 1997); MEASURED LIES: THE BELL CURVE EXAMINED (Joe L. Kincheloe et. al. eds., 1996);
Gardner, supra.
120. For example, unconscious activation of one's significant other who is either critical or
accepting can prompt consistent self-evaluations. See Mark W. Baldwin, Primed Relational Schemas as
a Source of Self-Evaluative Reactions, 13 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 380 (1994); see also Mark W.
Baldwin et. al., Priming Relationship Schemas: My Advisor and the Pope are Watching Me from the
Back of My Mind, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (1990) (showing self-evaluation consistent
with approving or disapproving subliminal primes of "personally significant authority figures").
121. One could ask the same question about even more substantial interventions, such as test
preparation courses. In one of our labs, a student recently improved his GRE score by a good 250
points by cramming for a month prior to the second test, making a crucial difference between getting
into a mediocre graduate program and a highly selective one. The fact that a mere month's worth of
study can radically change this measure suggests that we be cautious about its interpretation.
122. See. e.g., ALYSSA M. WALTERS ET AL.. EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, STEREOTYPE
THREAT, THE TEST-CENTER ENVIRONMENT, AND PERFORMANCE ON THE GRE GENERAL TEST 34-36
(2004), available at http://ftp.ets.org/pub/gre/gre-01-03R.pdf (studying environmental cues that might
trigger stereotype threat in GRE testing centers).
123. See Claude M. Steeie, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 613, 620 (1997). "Analysis of covariance was used to remove the
influence of participants' initial skills, measured by their verbal SAT scores, on their test performance."
Id1088 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol, 94:1063
belongs .,. means that in situations where the stereotype is applicable, one
is at risk of confirming it as a self-characterization, both to one's self and
to others who know the stereotype. This is what is meant by stereotype
threat.'"^" This possible confirmation triggered an anxiety that somehow
disrupted performance. Although the precise mechanism of this phenome-
non is still not well understood,'^^ there are now incontrovertible data of
such performance-disruption. These experiments include Blacks underper-
forming on tests of intellectual ability;'^* women underperforming on tests
of mathematical ability; elderly underperforming on memory tests;'^^ and
low socio-economic status students underperforming on verbal ability
tests.'^' In certain contexts, Whites are also subject to stereotype-threat, for
example when reminded of Asian superiority before taking a math exam.'^'
Researchers have replicated these results across a broad developmental
span, ranging from elementary school to college.'^" Not only are intelli-
gence tests vulnerable; researchers have also found evidence of stereotype-
threat in sporting activities.'^'
124, Claude M, Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995).
125. See Jessi L. Smith, Understanding the Process of Stereotype Threat: A Review of Mediational
Variables and New Performance Goal Directions, 16 EDUC, PSYCHOL, REV, 177, 178 (2004)
(providing the inconclusive results of various stereotype threat mechanism studies, which considered
anxiety, evaluation apprehension, performance confidence, effort, self-handicapping, perceptions of a
test fairness, stereotype endorsement, and other individual differences); see also S, Christian Wheeler
& Richard E, Petty, The Effects Of Stereotype Activation On Behavior: A Review Of Possible
Mechanisms, 127 PSYCHOL, BULL. 797 (2001) (discussing mechanisms).
126. See generally Steele, supra note 123.
127, Becca Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping, 71 J,
PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 1092, 1092-1101 (fmding subliminal priming of positive stereotypes of
aging improved memory performance for elderly subjects while priming of negative stereotypes of
aging worsened memory performance).
128, Jean-Claude Croizet & Theresa Claire, Extending the Concept of Stereotype Threat to Social
Class: The Intellectual Underperformance of Students from Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds, 24
PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, BULL, 588 (1998) (demonstrating that when SES stereotypes were
triggered by asking students about their "parents' occupation and education level," low SES students
performed worse than high SES students when a verbal test was presented as a measure of "intellectual
ability" but not when presented as a memory test),
129. See Joshua Aronson, et al.. When White Men Can't Do Math:Necessary and Sufftcient
Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC, PSYCHOL, 29, 38 (1999), White (including
Jewish) students who had an average SAT math score of 712,17 took a difficult eighteen question GRE
math test. Those under the stereotype threat condition were exposed to newspaper articles about Asian
superiority in math; the control group was not. Performance was substantially depressed by the
stereotype threat (number of accurate answers M= 6,55 versus M= 9.58 for the control group;/) < ,01),
See id. at 33-34,
130, See, e.g., N, Ambady et al,. Stereotype Susceptibility in Children: Effects of Identity
Activation on Quantitative Performance, 12 PSYCHOL, SCI, 385 (2001); C, McKown & R. S. Weinstein,
The Development and Consequences Of Stereotype Consciousness In Middle Childhood, 74 CHILD
DEV, 498 (2003),
131. J. Stone et al.. Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic Performance, 11 J,
PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 1213 (1999).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1089
Researchers have also found evidence of two additional ef-
fects: stereotype boost'^^ and stereotype lift,'" Stereotype-ioo5? takes place
when unconscious activation of a particular identity improves, not de-
presses, performance.'^" Margaret Shih and her colleagues first demon-
strated this phenomenon by testing Asian American women on difficult
math tests, after subliminally priming them with an Asian, female, or con-
trol category. They found that the participant group primed with the Asian
identity performed best (an accuracy of M = 54% on a difficult twelve
question math test), the control group that had no identity primed came
next, and the group primed with its female identity performed the worst
(accuracy of M= 43%).'^' Thus the "Asian American" cue raised math per-
formance, whereas the "female" cue decreased math performance.
A related phenomenon is stereotype lift., which is increased perform-
ance "caused by the awareness that an outgroup is negatively stereo-
typed."'^* This finding of lift is more insidious than the finding of boost
because it shows that the derogation of outgroups can improve one's own
scores. Through a meta-analysis of stereotype threat studies, Gregory
Walton and Geoffrey Cohen focused solely on the performance of White
men. Specifically, they compared how White men performed in conditions
designed to trigger stereotype-threat in others as compared to how White
men performed in the control conditions. They found that White men per-
formed better in the former condition.'" In terms of effect sizes, translated
to the SAT scale. White males received a fifty-point advantage.'^*
These are surprising and disturbing fmdings. Such effects do not ex-
plain entirely the differentials in testing across various social categories.
But they should give us pause as we confront the fact that arbitrary envi-
ronmental cues can trigger implicit cognitive processes that interfere with
or facilitate performance on seemingly objective measures. What we
thought to be fair assessments of "merit" can tum out to be mismeasure-
ments—not because of explicit animus but because of hidden mental proc-
esses that by their nature cannot reach conscious awareness.'" 139
132. See Margaret Shih et al,. Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL, SCI. 80 (1999) [hereinafter Stereotype Susceptibility]-,
Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Performance Boosts: The Impact of Self-Relevance and the Manner of
Stereotype Activation, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc, PSYCHOL, 638, 638 (2002) (discussing studies).
133, See Gregory M, Walton & Geoffrey L, Cohen, Stereotype Lift, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL, 456 (2003).
134, Shih, Stereotype Susceptibility, supra note 132, at 80-81.
135. See id. at 81. These differences were statistically significant under a linear contrast analysis
(p<.05).
136. See Walton & Cohen, supra note 133, at 456.
137, W, at 463 (rf= 0.24;p< 0,0001),
138. See id.
139, One could argue that there is in fact no mismeasurement because those who suffer from
permanently debilitating performance drags, regardless of their unfortunate causes, have less merit. At
bottom, this is a definitional claim about what "merit" encompasses. But notice that the disruptions are1090 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
In sum, as perceivers, we may misperceive, even though we honestly
believe we are fair and just. As targets, we may underperform, even though
we proudly assert immunity from negative stereotypes about our identity
groups. These mismeasurements have immediate consequences that can
extend into the future, by creating self-fulfilling prophecies that generate
long-term path dependencies. Worse, these errors are not randomly dis-
persed and hence likely to wash out over time; instead, they have a system-
atic tilt in the direction ofthe implicit bias. As discussed in Part I, problems
in the future will not be easy to remedy on the basis of unfairness experi-
enced in the past. Accordingly, we have even more reason to root out mis-
measurements of merit now.
C. Better Measures of Merit
If current measures of merit are defective, and we have reasons to be
wary of both subjective and objective measures, what is to be done? We
proffer no silver bullets, for the science provides none. Instead, we provide
a few modest interventions that address both perceiver and target effects.
Given space constraints, we only sketch out suggestions, which we hope
will be pursued in greater detail as part of a behavioral realist research
agenda.
I. Motivate Decision Makers to Correct Bias by Increasing Self
Awareness
As a threshold matter, in order to correct bias, decision makers in ad-
missions, hiring, and contracting must be made aware of their own implicit
biases. Since so many of us are convinced that we are race- or gender-
blind, we tend to dismiss evidence of pervasive implicit bias as somehow
inapplicable to ourselves.'"" In other words, we assume that we are
not always stable and inevitable; rather, they are often highly reactive to small changes in
environmental conditions. Because merit traditionally understood reflects stable characteristics internal
to the individual, it seems odd now to incotporate erratic, environmentally induced disruptions into the
definition. Further, on both efficiency and fairness grounds, it makes sense to prevent these disruptions
instead of normalizing them as simply a part of merit.
140. Our call for increased self-awareness should not be misunderstood as a naive embrace of
"diversity training," regardless of its form. Professional consultants encourage self-awareness through
various strategies. As numerous commentators have noted, such programs may or may not be
successful along various metrics. See, e.g., Kimbcrly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the
Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 515 (2003) (noting some studies provide
"little empirical support. .. that diversity training contributes to attitudinal or behavioral changes," and
some evidence suggests such training decreases tolerance, but other studies indicate participants have
"generally positive reactions to diversity training"); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are
There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
493, 593-95 (1996). Although we advocate self-awareness of implicit bias, we take no general stance
on the larger dispute over diversity training.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1091
somehow exceptional and immune from the cognitive errors that others
make."" Accordingly, actual self-diagnosis should be encouraged.
In practical terms, this means that those who admit, hire, select, and
evaluate should volunteer to experience their bias directly. Implementation
costs are minimal because tests like the implicit association test (IAT) can
be taken online, free of charge.'"^ Numerous anecdotal reports suggest that
the experience ofthe test creates a new form of self-awareness that is strik-
ing and persuasive.'"^ Of course, some individuals may see little or no pref-
erence. But this too is valuable self-discovery. Among those who see an
associational preference, many will protest that the test means nothing,
which raises again the question of predictive validity of real-world dis-
crimination. But by this point, any claim of total color- or gender-blindness
is disproved; rather, the claim has shifted to behavioral neutrality notwith-
standing mental preference. Even this increase in self-understanding is
valuable because it motivates individuals to consider implementing per-
sonal and institutional processes that prevent behavioral manifestations of
implicit bias. Finally, to the extent that fear of legal liability would dis-
courage such self-testing, we agree with Deana Pollard that an evidentiary
privilege should be carefully crafted and recognized.'""
A call for increased self-awareness is neither new nor restricted to
arguments based on ISC. For example, Susan Sturm has highlighted how
Deloitte and Touche addressed the question of gender disparities in their
business.'"' Until that firm actually measured the gender distribution of
work assignments, it was unaware of how its informal procedures system-
atically doled out less desirable work to women.'"* Upon becoming aware
of this issue, Deloitte and Touche instituted reforms, which included an
141. See generally David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: A Bias in the Perception of
Freedom From Bias (1998) (unpublished dissertation); Nandita Murukutla & David A. Armor, Illusions
of Objectivity and the Dispute over Kashmir. An Experimental Test of the Effects of Disagreement
(Oct. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript). Ironically, those who seem most confident of their objectivity
may turn out to discriminate the most. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed
Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCL 474, 479 (2005).
142. See Project Implicit, http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
143. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al.. Consequential Validity of the Implicit Association
Test: Comment on the Article by Blanton and Jaccard, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 56-61 (2006).
(describing how the IAT produces a "palpable" experience of bias and calling this phenomenon
potentially "its central asset"); Shankar Vedantam, No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12
(providing anecdotes).
144. See Pollard, supra note 80, at 997-1018.
145. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 CoLUM. L. REV. 458, 492-93 (2001) (pointing out that despite hiring women at a 50% rate,
Deloitte's "rate of promotion hovered at around 10%").
146. See id. at 496 ("The Task Force found that on the accounting side, women's assignments
tended to be clustered in not-for-profit companies, health care, and retail Women were rarely
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annual audit of work assignments.'"' This example demonstrates how we
can achieve self-awareness by measuring actual outcomes (such as work
distribution or rates of promotion) and comparing them to some baseline
expectation. The IAT provides self-insight by measuring our associational
preferences and comparing them to the baseline expectation of neutrality.
2. Prevent the Influence of Implicit Bias
a. Cloak Social Category
If an individual cannot be mapped to a racial or gender category be-
cause such information is successfully cloaked,'"* then implicit (or even
explicit) bias cannot readily influence the evaluation. Thus, where feasible,
we recommend cloaking social category in order to prevent biased percep-
tions.
Impressive evidence of the benefits of cloaking comes from the well-
publicized studies of orchestra auditions. When musicians perform behind
a screen, so that judges hear only the music and cannot see the performer,
judges choose different musicians. In the early 1970s with pressure from
unions, American Symphony Orchestras implemented blind auditioning.
Consequently, more female musicians who played a variety of instruments
joined the lone female harp.'"' The more recent "resume study" conducted
by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan provides fiirther support
for cloaking social categories. The researchers sent out fictional resumes
that differed only with respect to whether the applicant had a Black- or
White-sounding name (for example, Jamaal Jones vs. James Jones). The
results showed sizable disparate treatment effects, with the White-named
applicants receiving fifty percent more callback interviews.""
In both studies, it is possible that explicit bias drove some of the dis-
parate treatment. But implicit bias is also implicated because decision
147. Sturm reports substantial improvements in gender disparities following these changes. See id.
at 498 ("By 1995, 23% of senior managers were women, the percentage of women admitted to partner
rose from 8% in 1991 to 21% ").
148. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Cyber-race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133-34 (2000) (providing the
anecdote ofa minority employing a buying agent to purchase a car as an example of cloaking because it
"remove[s] racialized negotiations from the car buying ritual"); see also Kang, supra note 12, at 1499-
1504 (describing racial mapping as component of racial mechanics model).
149. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000).
150. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily And Greg More Employable Than
Lakisha And Jamal? A Field Experiment On Labor Market Discrimination 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003). For a detailed description of the methodology and results in
the law reviews, in the context ofa behavioral realist project, see Kang, supra note 12, at 1515-17. For
a similar study on gender, see David Neumark, Roy J. Bank & Kyle D. Van Nort, Sex Discrimination
in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study 710 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5024,
1995) (finding gender discrimination in interview callbacks at high priced restaurants). See generally
P.A. Riach & J. Rich, Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place, 112 ECON. J. 480
(2002) (summarizing field experiments over three decades and ten different nations).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1093
makers should be expected to prefer the best musician or employee irre-
spective of gender and race. Preventing irrelevant information from influ-
encing decision making is a simple and smart way to measure merit more
accurately.
Social category cloaking can be implemented in both educational and
employment settings. For example, schools can conduct blind grading of
student work.'^' In the hiring context, we can remove names, pictures, and
other category-signaling data by temporarily assigning candidates pseudo-
nyms. In the marketplace, given evidence of discrimination in car'^^ and
real estate purchases,'" pseudonymous credit credentialing, purchase in-
termediaries, and auction systems could make big-ticket sales possible
while cloaking identity.'^" Cyberspace and virtual worlds offer still other
avenues for interaction while cloaking identity.'"
Our call for race and gender cloaking is not naive. Creating successful
cloaking regimes is difficult given the myriad ways that social category
membership is signaled.'^* It also does nothing to correct for accumulated
discrimination.'" Finally, cloaking will not magically erase group differ-
ences in performance: one sees, for instance, gender and race differences in
law school examinations even when they are graded blind. None of this.
151. In this discussion, we do not take any position for or against time-pressured, closed-book, in-
class examinations as compared to, for example, open-book, day-long, take home exams. Different
exam formats may produce different disparities; for example, the former exam format may produce a
greater gender gap than the latter. Insisting that the former exam format is the better measure of merit
invites a critique from the "merit as traud" position: What is your evidence?
152. See Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Risso, Consumer Information
and Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?, 1
QUANTITATIVE MKTG. & ECON. 65, 68, 91 (2003) (finding that Internet purchasing of cars eliminates
most of the race premium (all less than 2.3%, depending on which variables are controlled) that
minorities otherwise end up paying).
153. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 99-100 (1993) (reporting studies by HUD and George Galster
showing racial discrimination in sales and rental markets).
154. See James Bandler, Harvard Ponders A River Crossing; Some Graduate Facilities May
Relocate To Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 1999, at BI (describing Harvard's purchase through a
private broker so that sellers would not raise prices).
155. For an extensive discussion of how cyberspace can be used to "abolish" race in market
transactions, see Kang, supra note 148, at 1133-35, 1154-60 (including discussion of pseudonymous
credentialing systems).
156. See, e.g., Kang, 5«pra note 155, at 1156-60.
157. "In principle, blinding appears to quality as a fool-proof method of avoiding unintended
discrimination" but in practice, blinding can only account for "stigmatizing attribute[s]" and fails to
account for other manifestations of discrimination. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition. Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 19 (1995).
For example, orchestras now have candidates audition out of the sight of evaluators to remove gender
biasing cues. However, to the extent male performers have accrued the benefits of past discrimination
resulting in a distinguishable difference in ability (e.g., opportunity to attend Juilliard), men will
continue to "maintain relative success" because the "[d]isadvantages [women have] inherited from past
discrimination are not undone by blinding." Id.1094 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
however, refutes our claim that cloaking social category produces more
accurate evaluations of merit.
Our recommendation is distinct from the standard demand for color or
gender-blindness. As typically formulated, this is a moral exhortation for
actors in some delimited public sphere to simply ignore race and gender
when making decisions. In other words, even though the social category
information is perceived, actors are encouraged to apply cognitive effort to
ignore it. As we have pointed out, an explicit commitment to be cognitively
blind hardly guarantees neutral behavior. We therefore recommend the
proactive strategy of self-awareness (to leam that we are not color or gen-
der blind) and the prophylactic strategy of removing the information from
even entering the cognitive decision making process. Once such informa-
tion seeps in, mere exhortations to ignore it must be viewed skeptically.
We must be behaviorally realistic.
To avoid misunderstanding, we underscore that our analysis assumes
that the social category is in fact irrelevant to merit. If that is not the case—
for example, gender would be relevant to picking an undercover agent to
infiltrate a gang of female bikers—then cloaking social category would be
irrational. We also note that a more accurate measurement of merit does
not have to be the sole driver of a selection system. Other considerations,
such as corrective and distributive justice, which can extend beyond the
scope of "fair measures," can warrant adjustments on the basis of race and
gender. In such cases, we recommend a two-step selection process, in
which identity is cloaked in the first-step to gauge "merit," but then the veil
is lifted in a second-step to evaluate any additional considerations. Our call
for cloaking to prevent implicit-bias induced discrimination is agnostic
about whether these additional considerations are warranted.
b. Discount the Emphasis on Traditional Interview
Another way to reduce perceiver-side bias is to decrease subjective
discretion in the merit measurement. Interviews are extraordinarily subjec-
tive, and for the past four decades, evidence has mounted that making deci-
sions based on interviews produces worse outcomes than arriving at them
via the paper record.'^^ On the basis of such evidence, the Princeton phi-
losophy department decided decades ago not to interview for tenure-track
jobs. It makes its judgments solely on the paper record.
Recently, we have also leamed that interview interactions can be in-
fluenced by implicit bias. For example, Allen McConnell and Jill Leibold
158. See Richard D. Arvey, Unfair Discrimination in the Employment Interview: Legal and
Psychological Aspects, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 736, 759-60 (1979); Linda L. Frank & J. Richard
Hackman, Effects of Interviewer-Interviewee Similarity on Interviewer Objectivity in College
Admissions Interviews, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 356 (1975); Eugene C. Mayfield, The Selection
Interview: A Re-evaluation of Published Research, 17 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 239 (1964); Lynn Ulrich
& Don Trumbo, The Selection Interview Since 1949,63 PSYCHOL. BULL. 100 (1965).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1095
demonstrated the linkage between IAT results and intergroup behavior. In
this experiment, White participants were required to interact with White
and Black confederates under scripted conditions. Trained third parties
blind to the purpose of the experiment and participants' bias scores coded
the participants' body language during the interactions to measure overall
friendliness. The trained observers scored items such as eye contact, for-
ward body lean, arm positioning, and number of speech errors.'^' The
higher the implicit bias, the more awkward was the social interaction.'*"
Although awkwardness might seem trivial, prior research confirms
that awkwardness leads to worse interviews. Early research by Carl Word,
Mark Zanna, and Joel Cooper demonstrated that when White interviewers
(confederates) were trained to perform unfriendly nonverbal behavior —
the sort that has now been correlated with higher implicit bias against racial
minorities'*'—in front of White interviewees (study participants), those
interviewees gave worse interviews, as measured objectively by third par-
ties blind to the purpose of the experiment.'*^ A positive feedback loop
typically creates a vicious cycle in which the unfriendly behavior is repli-
cated by the target, and the social interaction degrades.'" The conse-
quences are weighty. For instance, in law firm hiring, interviews are mostly
a check of "personality" or "fit."'*^ Accordingly, an uncomfortable inter-
view can make all the difference.
Obviously, in various hiring contexts—for example, at promotion as
opposed to initial hiring'*'—it will be infeasible to remove interviews or
evaluations based on social interactions entirely. But its weighting relative
to other performance measures can be decreased. In addition, by interview-
ing an extensive pool of potential candidates and evaluating them in
159. Other observed behaviors included abruptness, general comfort level, degree of laughter,
forward body lean, direction of body facing experimenter, openness of arms, expressiveness of arms,
distance between seats, speaking time, number of smiles, number of speech hesitations, number of
fidgeting body movements, and number of extemporaneous social comments. Allen R. McConnell &
Jill M. Leibold, Relations among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit
Measures of Racial Attitudes, 'il J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435,438 (2001).
160. 5eeW. at439.
161. See Carl O. Word et al. The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974).
162. See id
163. See Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The
Self Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
541,554-55(1997).
164. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 140, at 547-48, 557-59.
165. Cf Robert E. Thomas & Bruce Louis Rich, Under the Radar: The Resistance of Promotion
Biases to Market Economic Forces, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 301, 303-05 (2005) (distinguishing entry-
level labor market and promotion labor market in a hierarchical organization, and explaining that merit
measurements in the latter market are much more difficult to evaluate).1096 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
accordance with well-specified, pre-set guidelines, decision makers can
diminish interview subjectivity.'*''
Recent research has confirmed the value of adopting such approaches.
Using subsequent ratings of job performance or training performance as the
criteria for measuring the validity of interviews, studies have shown that
behavior-based, structured interviews do better than unstmctured inter-
views at predicting on-the-job success. In other words, the more unstruc-
tured the interview, and hence the greater the chance for individual
preferences to play a role in decision-making, the poorer the outcome. The
paper record and structured interviews combat these biases better than stan-
dard interviews alone.""'
c. Remove Stereotype-Threat Triggers
Up to now, we have discussed how society might intervene on the
perceiver side to produce fairer measures of largely subjective evaluations.
What might be done on the target side, regarding stereotype threat, which
warps even objective evaluations? We know of no sure-fire solutions to
this problem, partly because researchers have not yet identified the precise
cognitive mechanisms ofthe threat.'** On the limited information we have,
we make a few modest suggestions.
First, stereotype threat can sometimes be decreased by telling test-
takers that the stereotype is irrelevant. One can simply assert that the test is
not "diagnostic" ofthe stereotyped trait. For example, one can explain that
the test is an "exercise" and not a test of native "intelligence." Under these
conditions, the Black undergraduates in the Steeie and Aronson
166. One example comes from a class action suit by female employees against Home Depot,
which ended in a consent decree. The settlement required structural changes that allowed employees to
express their job preferences in a computer database, which generated automatic lists of qualified
employees for any available promotion. It also required that decision makers interview at least three
candidates for each position pursuant to a guided script. By various accounts, these reforms were
successful. See generally Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII As A Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 684-85 (2003) (noting that the consent decree was
lifted a year earlier than planned). But see Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of
Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1249, 1285-88
(2003) (expressing skepticism).
167. Elaine D. Pulakos & Neal Schmitt, Experience-Based and Situational Interview
Questions: Studies of Validity, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 289, 306 (1995) ("Interviews in which
applicants are asked the same job-relevant questions and whose answers are evaluated using
specifically anchored rating scales are likely to produce higher levels of validity than other types of
interviews."). Cf Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 141, at 479 (discussing evidence that a prior
commitment to specific merit standards erased gender discrimination caused by the tendency to
redefine merit "to fit the idiosyncratic qualifications of applicants who belonged to favored groups").
168. See supra note 125. There have been some promising advances, however, on this front. See,
e.g., Jean-Claude Croizet et al.. Stereotype Threat Undermines Intellectual Performance by Triggering
a Disruptive Mental Load, 30 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 721, 726 (2004).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1097
experiments showed no depression of test scores.'*' Also, one can proclaim
that regardless of the general diagnostic or nondiagnostic nature of a par-
ticular type of exam, this particular test shows no differences among social
categories. For example, Steven Spencer and his colleagues demonstrated
that women were generally subject to stereotype threat on math tests. How-
ever, when they were instructed that this particular test showed no gender
difference, the stereotype threat disappeared.'™ Any such proclamations
would have to be credible. If it is well established and well known that the
LSAT features a robust racial disparity, a proctor's tepid denial of that fact
before the examination may not neutralize the stereotype threat.'^'
Second, a person's particular theory of intelligence might alter her
vulnerability to stereotype threat. If one believes that intelligence is mostly
natural, given, and fixed, one is more susceptible. By contrast, if one be-
lieves that intelligence is mostly nurtured, achieved, and malleable, one is
more resistant to stereotype threat.''^ Recently, Catherine Good and her
colleagues confirmed these laboratory findings in a real-world field ex-
periment in the state of Texas. By giving seventh grade students mentors
who emphasized an intelligence-is-malleable message instead of a control
message about drug abuse, these researchers prevented stereotype-threat
from depressing the performance of seventh grade girls on standardized
math exams.'^^ The effect sizes were substantial. On these standardized
tests, a score below 70 is similar to failing. In the control condition, the
girls scored a mean of 74 compared to the boys' mean score of 81.55. By
contrast, in the treatment condition (which included two different kinds of
messages about intelligence malleability), the girls averaged 84.06, with
the boys actually scoring slightly less.'''' This slight difference was not sta-
tistically significant. In other words, under the intelligence-is-malleable
condition, the girls scored on average the same as the boys and showed no
stereotype-threat depression in performance.
Third, there may be ways to disarm environmental triggers of the
stereotype threat. Triggers can range from extremely subtle (e.g., being a
numerical minority in the examination room) to obvious (e.g., being
169. See Claude M. Steeie, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 613 (1997).
170. See Steven J. Spencer et al.. Stereotype Threat and Women's Math Performance, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 11, 13, 17 (1999).
171. Difficult ethical questions are raised by this potential strategy. For instance, under what
conditions may a professor state that his exams do not show any race disparities in order to minimize
stereotype threat? Can she say so without actually checking, knowing that the simple statement might
create a self-fulfilling prophecy?
172. See Joshua Aronson et al.. Reducing the Effects of Stereotype Threat on African American
College Students by Shaping Theories of Intelligence, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 113 (2002).
173. See Catherine Good et al.. Improving Adolescents' Standardized Test Performance:An
Intervention to Reduce the Effects of Stereotype Threat, 24 APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 645, 655-56
(2003).
174. See id at 656.1098 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
explicitly told of stereotypes regarding performance).'^^ In certain cases,
such as in high stakes testing, preventing the trigger may be impossible.'^^
But in other cases, one might change or avoid certain media and environ-
mental cues to decrease the likelihood of stereotj^e activation. For exam-
ple, in one study by Paul Davies and his colleagues about television
commercials, male and female participants were exposed to a set of stereo-
typic or counterstereotypic television commercials.'" In addition to a set of
commercials common to both groups, there was a stereotypic set that fea-
tured a commercial with a woman excited about acne medicine, and an-
other excited about brownies. A counterstereotypic set featured one
commercial with a woman demonstrating automotive expertise, and an-
other demonstrating healthcare expertise. After viewing these commercials,
the participants took a difficult math test. When primed with counterstereo-
typic ads, women and men scored equally well {M= 31% for women; M=
34% for men). Yet in the stereotypic condition, women performed far
worse than the men (M= 19% and M= 39% respectively).'^^ Such studies
identify the issue—^the importance of environmental cues—but do not pro-
vide concrete, foolproof methods to avoid stereotype activation. We simply
point out that as our scientific understanding improves, a wide range of
strategies may become relevant, including media interventions'™ and non-
conscious priming.'*"
3. Correct Mismeasures: Breaking Ties in Favor of Bias Targets
Suppose two candidates end up in a tie for some position. However,
one candidate belongs to a social category that suffers from implicit bias,
which may have depressed her merit scores. In such a case, instead of flip-
ping a coin, the tie should be broken in favor of that candidate. Our justifi-
cation is not corrective justice or moral desert. Rather, the justification is
175. See Smith, supra note 125, at 181.
176. Some laboratory studies found that the race/ethnicity or gender ofthe proctor could influence
whether the stereotype threat was activated. See. e.g., D.M. Marx & J.S. Roman, Female Role
Models: Protecting Women's Math Test Performance, 28 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1183 (2002) (gender); A.M. Walters, J.A. Shepperd & L.M. Brown, The Effect of Test Administrator
Ethnicity on Test Performance, (2003) (unpublished manuscript). The Educational Testing Service
performed a real-world study, and although it had various methodological limitations, it could not
replicate these findings in operational settings. See WALTERS, ET AL., supra note 122, at 34.
177. Paul G. Davies et al.. Consuming Images: How Television Commercials That Elicit
Stereotype Threat Can Restrain Women Academically and Professionally, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PsvcHOL. BULL. 1615,1619(2002).
178. Mat 1620 (p< 0.01).
179. See generally Kang, supra note 12, at 1549-63, 1579-85 (discussing the harm of local news
and the possibility of debiasing public service announcements as a disinfection strategy).
180. See, e.g., Kai Sassenberg & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Don't Stereotype. Think Different!
Overcoming Automatic Stereotype Activation by Mindset Priming, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
506 (2005) (providing some evidence that unconscious priming to think creatively decreases activation
of stereotypes).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1099
that any candidate who registers a tie on an instrument that is biased
against her is likely to be the stronger candidate. One cannot be certain in
any specific case, but on average, this approach will measure merit more
accurately.
Operationalizing this simple insight is, unfortunately, complex. First,
many implicit biases exist, not only those based on immutable social cate-
gories. For example, there is ingroup bias based on school attended, geo-
graphic region, physical similarity, or shared culture (jokes, knowledge,
artistic interests etc.). To obtain the most accurate merit measure, one
should account for all these biases in any tie-breaking algorithm. But the
attempt to be comprehensive increases both the cost of the selection proc-
ess and the likelihood of cross-cutting biases on the same or both sides of
the equation. For example, when a younger East coast woman with average
looks is tied with an older, short, but attractive, Midwestern man for a
Silicon Valley job, how should the tie be broken? In practice, then, we
should focus on only the most consequential implicit biases, which future
research can help identify more precisely. In addition, other goals besides
the most accurate measure of merit, such as corrective justice, distributive
justice, or antisubordination based on immutable traits, can inform which
biases are most important to counter.
Second, it may be difficult to determine what constitutes a "tie." If
merit is measured qualitatively, ties occur when the evaluator feels that it is
a genuine toss-up between the two candidates in terms of merit. If merit is
measured quantitatively, ties occur when scores are identical. But notice
that even identical scores typically represent some banding. For example,
even if two candidates receive an identical LSAT score of 155, they may
not have answered the same number of questions correctly. If the LSAT
score were computed to another significant digit, one candidate may have
received 155.3, whereas the other 155.4. Nevertheless, the scores are both
reported and weighted as 155, a numerical tie. Such aggregation raises the
question of whether a score of 155 should be treated as a tie with a score of
154, and so on. Recall the facts oi Johnson v. Transportation AgencyJ^^ in
which Paul Johnson sued on the basis of his dispatcher examination score
of 75 being two points higher than that of Diane Joyce's score of 73.'*^
Should these results have been considered a tie?
Answering this question intelligently requires a lengthy and difficult
analysis, which we do not attempt here. We simply observe that in order to
account for random measurement error, one should consider the test's va-
lidity, reliability, standard error of measurement, standard error of
181. 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
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difference,'*^ confidence level desired that two different observed scores
reflect differences in true scores, and the costs of Type I and Type II er-
rors.'^" Also, to account for systematic error induced by stereotype threat,
boost, and lift, one should consider mean effect sizes of these testing phe-
nomena,'*^ their variance, and the likelihood the stereotype phenomenon
was triggered. An answer cannot be determined simply by applying uncon-
troversial statistical techniques. Rather, choices that reflect values ex-
pressed in uncertainty must be made. For purposes of this paper, we stake
out the most conservative position of counting only identically reported
scores as a tie.
The fair measures we have previously recommended, such as avoiding
unstructured interviews, were not facially race- or gender-based.
Accordingly, they are not especially vulnerable to legal challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII.'** However, the same cannot be
said of our tie-breaker recommendation, even in its most conservative for-
mulation, because it is explicitly race- and gender-conscious. That said, we
believe that tie-breakers established on the grounds that they are the more
accurate measures of merit can withstand legal scrutiny. The strongest le-
gal authority comes from the line of cases that have upheld tie-breaking in
favor of racial minorities under constitutional and Title VII challenge'*' in
the context of civil service exams for firefighters and law enforcers. The
governmental objective that was accepted in these cases was remedying
past discrimination. Our argument for breaking ties is stronger because the
objective is not to roughly remedy past discrimination, but to prevent pre-
sent acts of inaccurate measurement. Also, if some form of banding is
adopted in the definition of a "tie," that could not be said to constitute
183. For a discussion of these standard error measurements in the law reviews, see Selmi, supra
note 81, at 1272.
184. See Sheldon Zedeek et. al.. Sliding Bands: An Alternative to Top-down Selection, in FAIR
EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 222, 230-32 (Richard S. Barrett ed.,
1996) (providing a sliding band methodology, with width of the band set as a function of necessary
confidence level and risk analysis). Type I errors suppose that there is a difference between test scores
when in fact there is not. Type II errors suppose that there is no difference when in fact there is. See id.
at 232. For airing of some controversies around banding, see Michael A. Campion et al.. The
Controversy Over Score Banding in Personnel Selection: Answers to 10 Key Questions, 54 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 149 (2001); Wayne F. Cascio et. al.. Twenty Issues and Answers About Sliding Bands, 8
HUMAN PERF. 227,238 (1995) (rejecting, among other things, that banding is race-norming).
185. See Walton & Cohen, supra note 133, at 463 (comparing studies that affirmatively refute link
between test and stereotypes to those that do not; d= 0.24; p < 0.0001).
186. Cf. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that designing tests
to have less disparate impact does not violate equal protection or Title VII).
187. See, e.g.. Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003); Chicago Firefighters Local 2
V. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2001); Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v.
City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City and
County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 1992).2006] EAIR MEASURES 1101
race-norming,'** which is expressly proscribed by section 106 ofthe Civil
Rights Act of 1991.'*' Instead, as Judge Richard Posner put it, banding is
an "unquestioned method of simplifying scoring by eliminating meaning-
less gradations."""
Ill
DECREASING BIAS
A. Conventional Thinking: Social Contact Hypothesis
An asserted benefit of affirmative action has been integration within
the workplace and academic institutions that undermines stereotypes and
prejudice against disadvantaged groups. To be sure, some proponents care
only about affirmative action's capacity to redistribute material resources
fi'om privileged to subordinated groups without either hope or regard for
debiasing attitudes and beliefs. But, most affirmative action defenders have
trumpeted not only material but also psychological benefits. Indeed, mate-
rial redistribution without decreasing bias might be only a short-term solu-
tion because bias produces discrimination, which reproduces material
inequalities.
A principal mechanism for psychological change is the "social contact
hypothesis." This theory suggests that when individuals of different social
categories interact face-to-face under certain conditions, their stereotypes
and prejudice will be tempered. Since the 1950s when the social contact
hypothesis was first proposed, social psychologists have distilled the con-
ditions that contribute to a debiasing environment. People must
be: (1) exposed to disconfirming data; (2) interact with others of equal
status; (3) cooperate; (4) engage in non-superficial contact; and (5) receive
clear norms in favor of equality.'"
Many opponents of affirmative action vigorously dispute that affirma-
tive action improves attitudes in practice. For example, champions of co-
lorblindness argue that by being conscious of race, affirmative action
strengthens identification with and resentment across race. This is a bal-
kanization story fi-equently told by conservative commentators and
188. See, e.g., Chicago Firefighters Local 2, 249 F.3d at 656 (Posner, J.) (deciding question of
first impression).
189. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(l) ("Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores. It shall be an
unlawfiil employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of
applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff
scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.").
190. Chicago Firefighters Local 2, 249 F.3d at 656.
191. See Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Psychology of Desegregation. An
Introduction, in GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 1, 2 (Norman Miller
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skeptical judges."^ Further, many commentators, even those sympathetic to
affirmative action's goals, point out the difficulty in achieving the five
conditions listed above.''^ For example, by flexing traditional merit stan-
dards too much, we might create unequal engagements, which perversely
bolster, not undermine, stereotypes of inferiority.'''' The social contact hy-
pothesis has also been challenged by those farther out on the Left as both
ineffective and assimilationist."' What does implicit social cognition add
to the debate?
B. Behavioral Realism: Revising Mechanisms for Decreasing Bias
1. Social Contact Hypothesis (SCH)
Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp have recently provided a defini-
tive meta-analytic test of the SCH, which demonstrates that intergroup
192. In his Adarand eoneurrenee, Justiee Thomas warned that the eonseious use of raee "stamp[s]
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may eause them to develop dependeneies or to adopt an
attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241
(1995). At the same time, affirmative action programs "engender attitudes of superiority [in Whites] or,
alternatively, provoke resentment [because ofthe belief] they have been wronged by the government's
use of race." Id. at 241,
193. See Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika, supra note 80, at 1263-70.
194. See id. at 1263 (suggesting consensus view that preferential affirmative aetion can trigger
resentment and stereotypic evaluations). Cf. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 371-72 (2004) (arguing affirmative action has
created a system where "black law applicants end up at schools where they will struggle academically
and fail at higher rates than they would in the absence of preferences" resulting in blacks' lower bar
passage rates and depressed job opportunities upon graduation). Professor Sander's article prompted
numerous responses. See Ian Ayres & Riehard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of
Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005) (finding that "the elimination of affirmative
action would reduce the number of [black] lawyers"); David L. Chambers et. al.. The Real Impact of
Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's
Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1857 (2005) (asserting "[t]he conclusions in [Sander's article] rest on a
series of statistical errors, oversights, and implausible assumptions"); Kevin R. Johnson & Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of "A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that Sander "neglects to
account for the well-documented hostile environment... in law school and how it may adversely affect
academic performance"); David B. Wilkins, A Systemic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A
Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1918 (2005) (arguing Sander fails "to prove that grades
are more important than law school prestige for those black law students who actually become
lawyers").
195. Richard Delgado, for example, rejects the usefulness of social contact and instead encourages
direct confrontation as the best strategy to decrease bias. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth
Chronicle: The Problem ofthe Shanty, 85 GEO. L.J. 667, 682 (1997); Richard Delgado, Book Review,
Stark Karst, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1460, 1470-71 (1995). Cf Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good?
Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1859-60 (1992) (suggesting that social contact
theory is self-contradictory since creating equal status interactions is difficult in a racist society).
According to one recent study, confrontation may create guilt, especially among those with low explicit
prejudice, but not attitude change. See Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting
Prejudice (Literally): Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY & Soc.
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interaction decreases prejudice."* Reviewing 515 studies using 713 inde-
pendent samples that encotnpassed a quarter million people from 38 na-
tions, they found that intergroup contact correlates negatively with
prejudice (average r =-0.215; j? < .0001).'" The tnore careful and rigorous
the study, the larger the effect seen."** Also, none ofthe five elements out-
lined in the previous section were strictly necessary. Finally, the effect of a
broad range of intergroup contact situations showed generalization of the
improved attitude to tbe target's entire outgroup.
The researchers specifically examined whether tbe causal sequence
might be operating in reverse, i.e., whether less prejudiced people sought
out greater intergroup contact. By distinguishing studies by the degree of
choice persons bad in engaging in such contact, tbe researchers tested
whether selection bias was a significant problem. Holding relevant vari-
ables constant, they saw no significant correlation between "cboice" to in-
teract and the effect size in prejudice decrease {r = .005, p = .89)."' Tbe
broad lesson, then, is tbat social integration works.
Tbe more recent science of implicit social cognition (ISC) belps iden-
tify more precisely tbe conditions in wbicb bias is most likely to be re-
duced. Various ISC studies provide interesting results on tbis front. For
example, greater intergroup contact witb members of an outgroup has been
found to be associated with lower IAT attitudinal bias. In one study,
Christopher Aberson and his colleagues asked White participants to take
tbe race IAT and report the number of their close outgroup
friends: African-Americans in one experiment and Latinos in another.^""
On tbe basis of tbeir answers, the participants were put into one of two
categories: "no friends" or "friends." Tbe researcbers found negative corre-
lations between the number of interracial friendships and level of implicit
bias.^"' Reflecting the general pattern of dissociation, tbe friendship meas-
ure had no correlation to measures of explicit
196. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytie Test of Intergroup Contaet Theory,
90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006).
197. In this careful paper, the researchers also examined various threats to validity including the
causal sequence problem (due to potential selection bias of individuals in the experiments), the file
drawer problem, and the generalization of effects problem. They concluded that these results were not
artifacts of participant selection or publication bias; further, the effects typically generalized beyond the
specific participants in the contact situation. "Not only do attitudes toward the immediate participants
usually become more favorable, but so do attitudes toward the entire outgroup, outgroup members in
other situations, and even outgroups not involved in the contact." Id.
198. Ofthe seventy-seven samples that used the most rigorous measures of contact and prejudice,
as well as adequate controls, the mean effect was far stronger (r = -.323; p < .0001). Id.
199. See id.
200. Christopher L. Aberson, Carl Shoemaker & Christina Tomolillo, Implicit Bias and
Contact: The Rote of Interethnic Friendships, 144 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 335 (2004).
201. See id. at 340, 343 (African Americans and Latinos, respectively).
202. See id. at 341, 344 (African Americans and Latinos, respectively). One weakness of this
study is that it used self-reports of "close friends" without guidance or definition ofthe term.1104 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
In another study, Andreas Olsson and colleagues explored how fear is
learned and extinguished by measuring skin conductance on both Black
and White participants.^"' They detnonstrated that fear responses to both
ingroup and outgroup member pictures could be learned (by receiving
small electric shocks). These fear responses could also be extinguished, by
showing the pictures again but without the shocks; however, participants
retained "learned" fear for a longer time period when that fear was associ-
ated with a racial other.^** Researchers found, however, one mediator: this
response bias (of retaining fear of racial others longer) was negatively cor-
related with the number of outgroup romantic partners that the participant
had (r =-0.29,/JO.OS).^**'
While the studies just cited lend general support to the SCH, other
ISC research complicates the story. For example, in 2002, Joshua Correll
confirmed earlier fmdings of "shooter bias."^"* He created a video game
that flashed photographs of a White or Black individual holding either a
gun or harmless object (such as a cell phone).^"'' Participants were told to
decide to shoot if they saw a gun or to refrain from shooting if they did not
see a gun. Under severe time pressure, participants made errors, but they
were not randomly distributed. Instead, participants more often mistook a
Black target as armed when he was unarmed (false alarms);^"* conversely,
they more often mistook a White target as unarmed when he was armed
(misses).^"' Such shooter bias was found in both Black and White partici-
pants.^"* Still more perplexing—and connected to the SCH—is that shooter
bias was correlated with the amount of contact that the participants claimed
to have had with African Americans. If we believe these self-reports, we
have at least one study that shows that increased interracial contact pro-
duces a greater tendency to "shoot" African Americans.
One way to reconcile such contrary fmdings is to distinguish an "atti-
tude," which is a feeling or preference that carries with it an affective over-
tone, from a "stereotype," which reflects a belief about a group.^" Having a
203. See Olsson, supra note 65, at 785.
204. See id. at 786 (suggesting that this could be one reason why we have "more negative
evaluations ofthe outgroup").
205. See id. ("Specifically, the conditioning bias to outgroup faces was negatively correlated with
the reported number of outgroup, relative to ingroup, romantic partners.").
206. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86 (2001).
207. Joshua Correll et al.. The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315-17 (2002)
(describing experimental setup).
208. See id. at 1319. This finding was statistically significant atp < 0.02, with outlier images that
produced too many errors thrown out.
209. See id. This finding was significant atp< 0.001.
210. See id at \i25.
211. An example of an attitude is feeling positively toward the category of flowers. An example of
a stereotype is the belief that the category of rattling snakes may be poisonous.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1105
positive attitude toward a category does not preclude holding a negative
stereotype about that category. For example, most people exhibit an in-
group favoritism in their implicit attitudes. That is less true, however, with
implicit stereotypes. For example, women show an implicit attitudinal
preference for females over males,^'^ but they nonetheless show an implicit
stereotype linking females closer to family than career.^'^ It may be that the
"facts" as we perceive them in our daily lives affect us in ways that are
hard to set aside—even though being a member ofthe group encourages us
to reject the stereotype. Interestingly, subsequent shooter studies have
demonstrated that stereotypes, not attitudes, drive this bias.^'" Thus, in-
creased contact with African Americans may make implicit attitudes more
favorable, but any such improvement would not impact shooter bias, which
is stereotype driven.
In sum, research supports the value of intergroup contact to ameliorate
negative attitudes (also called "prejudice"). However, intergroup contact
may not counteract negative stereotypes. Clarification awaits frxture re-
search.
2. Countertypical Exemplars
In addition to refining the social contact hypothesis, ISC suggests a
slightly different mechanism for decreasing bias—exposure to "counter-
typical," by which we mean counterattitudinal or counterstereotypic, ex-
emplars. Consider the following three studies.
Countertypical celebrities. Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony
Greenwald found that implicit attitudes could be changed simply by
212. See. e.g., Laurie A. Rudman & Stephanie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic In-
Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More Than Men Like Men?, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 494, 506 (2004).
213. Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 108-09 (2002)
214. See Charles M. Judd et al.. Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the
Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 80
(2004). Treatments that decrease shooter bias have been consistent with this diagnosis. Ashby Plant and
colleagues demonstrated that shooter bias was eliminated for participants who were repeatedly exposed
to Black and White faces where there was no relation to race and the presence of a gun. E. Ashby Plant
et. al.. Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal
Suspects, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 147 (2005). The elimination of bias persisted after
a twenty-four hour period and also led to an "inhibition of racial concepts" (depressed ability to
complete race-related words). Id. at 149, 152-53. In contrast, shooter bias was not eliminated for
participants who were repeatedly exposed to Black and White faces when the Black face was associated
with the presence of a gun at a 70% rate. Id at 150-51; .see also E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche,
The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180
(2005) (demonstrating that police officers exhibited shooter bias but that it was eliminated after
multiple exposures to Black and White faces when there was no relation to race and the presence of a
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exposing people to pictures of particular individuals.^'^ First, researchers
gave participants a "general knowledge" questionnaire. For the pro-Black
condition group, the questionnaire contained names and images of positive
Black exemplars, such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Denzel Washington,
and negative White exemplars, such as Jeffrey Dahmer and Howard
Stem.^'* For the pro-White condition group, the questionnaire contained
names and images of negative Black exemplars, such as Louis Farrakhan
and Mike Tyson, and names and images of positive White exemplars, such
as John F. Kennedy and Peter Jennings.^" After finishing the question-
naire, participants took an IAT and then completed a survey of racial bias.
Although the type of questionnaire had no impact on participants' explicit
hias as measured hy self-reports, it had a surprisingly significant effect on
IAT scores. Participants in the pro-Black condition reduced their implicit
bias hy more than half.^'* The reduction persisted for a full day as meas-
tired hy a follow-up test.^''
Countertypical visualizations. Do we actually need to look at photo-
graphs of countertypical historical figures to reduce our implicit hias?
Perhaps we can reduce implicit hias simply by imagining the right exem-
plar. After all, Isahelle Klein and colleagues have shown that several brain
regions in the striate cortex show exactly the same pattern of activation
regardless of whether the individual is actually seeing or merely imagining
a specific object.^^" In fact, Irene Blair and colleagues demonstrated that
mental imagery, through a form of self-priming, moderated implicit stereo-
types.^^' A group of participants was instructed to spend a few minutes
215. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 800, 807 (2001).
216. The complete list of positive Black images included Martin Luther King, Jr., Jesse Jackson,
Colin Powell, Denzel Washington, Eddie Murphy, Michael Jordan, Tiger Woods, Will Smith, Bill
Cosby, and Gregory Hines. For negative White images, Dasgupta and Greenwald used Ted Bundy,
Jeffrey Dahmer, Timothy McVeigh, Charles Manson, Al Capone, Ted Kaczynski, Terry Nichols,
Howard Stem, John Gotti, and John Dillinger. See Wat 811. Obviously, the choice ofthese images
could be debated.
217. The negative Black images included O.J. Simpson, Mike Tyson, Louis Farrakhan, Marion
Barry, Arthur Washington, Lonny Gray, Tyshawn Williams, Charles Brackett, Michael McClinton, and
Stanley Obas. Positive White images included Clint Eastwood, Jim Carrey, Tom Cruise, David
Duchovny, Tom Hanks, Jay Leno, John F. Kennedy, Robert Redford, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Peter
Jennings. See id. at 812.
218. The net decrease came from faster reaction times for the "Black + pleasant" and the "White +
unpleasant" combinations in the IAT. Interestingly, the latencies for the "White + pleasant" and the
"Black + unpleasant" combinations did not change across the various exemplar conditions See id. at
807.
219. Id.
220. Isabellc Klein et al., Retinotopic Organization of Visual Mental Images as Revealed By
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 22 COGNITIVE BRAIN RES. 26,28-30 (2004).
221. Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away: The
Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc PSYCHOL
828,828-29(2001).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1107
imagining a strong woman, her attributes and abilities, and the hobbies she
enjoys; another group was instructed to imagine a Caribbean vacation.^^^
Those who imagined the strong woman registered a significantly lower
level of implicit stereotype in the IAT.^^^ Based on follow-up experiments
that included imagining different things and employed different measures
of implicit bias than the IAT, the researchers concluded that the counter-
stereotypic mental imagery caused the decrease in implicit stereotypes.^^"*
Countertypical teachers. There is even evidence of external validity
from real-world measurements. Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari
tracked longitudinally female students before and after their first year of
coUege.^^' Half the participants attended a coeducational college, whereas
the other half attended a women's college. Both groups took tests measur-
ing explicit and implicit bias against women and completed campus-
experience questionnaires.^^^ The two groups started with statistically in-
distinguishable levels of implicit bias: both groups viewed women stereo-
typically, as more "supportive" than "agentic."^" After one year of college,
however, the average implicit bias ofthe group that had attended women's
colleges disappeared, whereas the implicit bias of the group that had at-
tended coeducational colleges increased.^^* The researchers regressed cam-
pus environmental variables. For example, they asked whether lower
implicit bias correlated with the number of courses taken with gender-
related content, for example, in the Women's Studies department? The an-
swer was no. The only statistically significant correlation was "exposure of
female faculty"—defined as the number of women faculty and senior ad-
ministrators these students encountered.^^'
These ISC findings suggest that debiasing does not have to take place
solely through conventional peer-to-peer social contact, which is the
mechanism emphasized in the contact hypothesis. Debiasing can also take
place through repeat exposure to countertypical exemplars in positions of
222. Id at 830.
223. Id. at 831. For the neutral imagery group, the reaction time difference between the schema-
consistent and schema-inconsistent blocks was ninety-five milliseconds. For the counterstereotypic
imagery group, the difference was twenty-four milliseconds, which reached statistical significance at p
<0.05. S'eeiV^. at831 tbl.l.
224. Id at 837.
225. See generally Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (2004).
226. See id. at 649-50.
227. 5eeid. at651.
228. The mean IAT effect for those attending a women's college started at 31 milliseconds and
went down to -5 milliseconds. By contrast, the IAT effect for those attending a coed college started at
74 milliseconds and went up to 128 milliseconds. Id.
229. Id. ip = 0.004).1108 CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
authority.^^" Furthermore, both the countertypical-visualizations and the
countertypical-teachers studies demonstrated changes in implicit stereo-
types not just attitudes. To the extent that peer-to-peer social contact is
more effective in moderating attitudes than stereotypes, counterstereotypic
exemplars may be an important way to moderate implicit stereotypes.
These are not mutually exclusive mechanisms. Indeed, together, they may
well help produce a larger culture conducive to debiasing.
C Better Debiasing
If images we see and imagine can decrease our implicit bias, an inter-
esting range of possibilities become available for private, individual, vol-
untary, "do it yourself attitude makeovers. How do you decorate your
room? What is on your Screensaver?"' What is the office's decor?^^^ We do
not yet have definitive evidence that provides an uncontroversial list of
best practices. But we do want to highlight the increasing evidence. For
instance, Akalis and colleagues have begun a line of research showing that
it is possible through the ordinary concentration on particular thoughts
(positive thoughts about those who are overweight, for example) to reduce
bias on measures such as the IAT. Moreover, they show that compared to a
control group, yoga practitioners in India can lower their IAT bias after
five minutes of concentration. Notably, the yoga practitioners do not differ
from the control group at baseline - they show the same quite high bias
favoring their ingroup whether it is Indians (compared to Pakistanis), Hin-
dus (compared to Muslims) or high castes (compared to low castes).^"
These findings suggest that mental exercises might provide a path, how-
ever little understood at this time, which establishes control over seemingly
uncontrollable attitudes.
For purposes of revising affirmative action discourse, we focus not on
private, individual, voluntary makeovers, which do not raise the most diffi-
cult legal and policy questions. What if, instead, drawing on results such as
Dasgupta and Asgari's study, an institution hires certain people because of
their debiasing capacity on their students, customers, or employees? After
all, Brian Lowery, et al. showed that the mere presence of an African
230. Cf. Jonathan Alger, When Cotor-Btind is Cotor-Bland: Ensuring Faculty Diversity in Higher
Education, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 195 (1999) (suggesting that faculty diversity may be more
important than student diversity in decreasing stereotypes and observing that this is "an entirely
different sort" of role model theory).
231. See Kang, supra note 12, at 1537.
232. See. e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 12, at Part. II.B.3 (discussing manipulation of various
environmental stimuli, such as portraits on the wall).
233. Scott A. Akalis, Jhansi Nannapaneni, & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Do-It-Yourself Mental
Makeovers: How Directed Thinking Influences Implicit Attitudes (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Harvard University).2006] FAIR MEASURES 1109
American experimenter reduced race bias in White participants.""
Debiasing worked presumably because participants heard the African
American instructor give directions, be in charge, and implicitly hold
power. Likewise the studies discussed in the prior section provide us fur-
ther reason to think that such fmdings will appear in the scientific literature
shortly."' What would be the legal and policy implications of hiring what
we call "debiasing agents"?
1. Debiasing Agents
A debiasing agent is an individual with characteristics that run counter
to the attitudes and/or the stereotypes associated with the category to which
the agent belongs. Examples include women construction workers, male
nurses. Black intellectuals. White janitors, Asian CEOs, gay boxers, and
elderly marathon runners. In our times, individuals such as Toni Morrison,
Lance Armstrong, Tiger Woods, and Condoleezza Rice are debiasing
agents. Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. were debiasing
agents in their time. In order for the debiasing agent to be successful, per-
ceivers must map the agent to the relevant social category. Further, per-
ceivers must not dismiss the agent as a mere exception, but must recognize
the agent as anchored to that social category, notwithstanding his or her
countertypical qualities.
Although similar, we disentangle "debiasing agent" from the more
familiar "role model." The traditional role-model argument suggests that
we should grant affirmative action to women and racial minorities in teach-
ing and leadership positions because they can act as "models" for people of
the same social category. Both the Left and Right have protested the role-
model argument. For example, Richard Delgado argues that being a role
"model" requires women and minorities to be assimilationist, to suffer bur-
dens not placed on Whites and males, and to perpetuate a system-
reinforcing meritocratic myth that if you work hard, you can succeed "just
like me.""* At the same time. Justice Thomas chafes at the assumption that
234. See Brian S. Lowery, et al.. Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001).
235. Cf. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 12, at Part II.B.2 (recommending diversity in the supervisory
workforee); see also Stacey Sinclair et al.. Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of
Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 583, 590 (2005) (finding evidence in
support of an "affiliative social tuning hypothesis" in which White participants' implicit biases aligned
with the ostensible attitudes of experimenters that participants liked).
236. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to
Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226-29 (1991). Various commentators, in light of this
criticism, have tried to reframe the idea of "role model" to being a "mentor" or a "connected critic."
See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco, Collective Recognition as a Communitarian Device: Or, Of Course We
Want to Be Role Models!, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 81, 94-96 (1996) ("connected critic" drawing on the work of
philosopher Michael Walzer); Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Rote Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 93, 100-05 (1991) (mentor); Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black
Woman Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46,46 (1991) (mentor).1110 CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
we can only look up to those ofthe same race or gender.^" He would reject
the balkanizing notion that an Asian student can and should look up to an
Asian professor exclusively.
Courts have also raised legal objections. Under an equal protection
analysis, the Supreme Court in Wygant rejected a role-model theory be-
cause it did not seek to remedy past acts of discrimination, but instead
smacked of fonvard-looking social engineering, lacked a limitation princi-
ple that would circtimscribe the scope and duration of the program, and
encouraged a form of racial tracking between role model and beneficiary
that the court found distasteful.^^^ A general role-modeling justification has
also been rejected under Title VIL^^'
The debiasing agent justification differs from the role-model argtiment
in two ways. First, the beneficiary class is not restricted to those students
who occupy the same social category as the debiasing agent. Instead, debi-
asing affects all students and arguably is most important for those who are
not in the same social category. This difference avoids much of the bal-
kanization critique described above. Second, the objective in employing
debiasing agents is not to increase students' self-esteem or self-confidence,
or to catalyze their ability to imagine a different future, which may seem
like an open-ended, forward-looking social engineering objective. (If this is
a secondary effect, so be it, but that is not the purpose of debiasing agents.)
Instead, the purpose ofthe debiasing agent is to mitigate objectively meas-
urable bias by producing environmental conditions that alter the strength of
association between social category and attitude or attribute. This fits
squarely within the presentist framing of reducing discrimination here and
now.
237. Justice Thomas has critiqued the Court's voting dilution cases for resting on the "implicit
assumption that members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on important matters of public
policy and must have their own 'minority preferred' representatives... if they are to be considered
represented at all." Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). He would argue
that the role-model theory perpetuates the divisive notion that "members of [a] racial group must think
alike and [have] their [own] interests. . . distinct [from other racial groups]." Id. at 906. Similarly,
Shelby Steeie argues that race-based interventions such as "the ubiquitous idea of racial role models"
act to "suppress black individuals with the mark of race just as certainly as segregation did, by
relentlessly telling them that their racial identity is the most important thing about them." SHELBY
STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA 61 (1998).
238. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). In her concurring opinion. Justice
O'Connor distinguished diversity from the role model rationale. See id. at 289 ("The goal of providing
'role models' . . . should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity
among the faculty."). Justice Marshall emphasized that the beneficiary class of diversity is the entire
student body. See id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recommending remanding the case and noting
that if it could be established that the hiring policy "sought to achieve diversity and stability for the
benefit oi all students" it would be constitutional) (emphasis in original).
239. See Taxman v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane). Further
discussion of Taxman appears infra text accompanying note 254.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1111
2. Legality
Consider the following hypothetical: A business school hires an Asian
professor partly to decrease bias against Asians^"" among business school
students. A White candidate with comparable qualifications who did not
get hired sues the (public) business school. What are the merits of the
White person's equal protection and Title VII claims?
Equal protection. Given Wygant's rejection ofthe "role model" argu-
ment,^"' could a debiasing agent justification nevertheless withstand equal
protection scrutiny? First, we must determine the appropriate standard of
review. One could plausibly argue that crediting individuals for their debi-
asing capacities is not a facial racial classification and thus does not war-
rant strict scrutiny. That is because a particular race is neither necessary
nor sufficient for debiasing. For example, a person who does not regard
herself as Asian (perhaps because she has an interracial background and
regards herself as hapa) may nevertheless decrease anti-Asian implicit bias
(because she "looks" Asian).^"^ Conversely, not all Asians will have debi-
asing capacity; only those who overperform countertypieal qualities will.
Even if this formalistic argument is plausible,^"' we do not pursue it. We
are interested in tackling the hardest case, and thus assume that strict scru-
tiny applies.
That means we must demonstrate a "compelling" interest. Again, the
goal of debiasing is not to increase self-esteem, but to decrease discrimina-
tion caused by implicit bias. As we demonstrated in Part I, that interest is
"compelling." One distinction here is that the goal is not to prevent dis-
crimination by the business school itself but by its future graduates. Since
there is some uncertainty about the degree to which any actor can try to
respond to discrimination committed by another actor, this distinction is
worth further examination. In the end, however, this distinction should
240. Asians are viewed as competent but not sociable. See Monica H. Lin et al., Stereotype
Content Model Explains Prejudice for an Envied Outgroup: Scale of Anti-Asian American Stereotypes,
31 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 34 (2005) (explicit self-reports). Also, Whites are viewed as
more "American" than "Foreign" as compared to Asian Americans. See Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 447, 453, 457 (2005) (using IAT).
For narrative discussion of anti-Asian bias in the law reviews, see, e.g., Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" &
Asian American Identities: Yellowface. World War II Propaganda and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1999); Jerry Kang, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1926(1993).
241. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 497-98 (plurality opinion) (citing and summarizing Wygant's view of role models).
242. Suppose that Tiger Woods does not regard himself as Black (his father self-identifies as
African American; his mother self-identifies as Thai.) Nonetheless, he may decrease implicit bias
against Blacks.
243. See. e.g.. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 14-20 (2003)
(demonstrating indeterminacy of what counts as a racial classification).1112 CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
make no constitutional difference, in light ofthe Supreme Court's decision
in Grutter.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court emphasized that student diversity
was valuable because it could help "break down racial stereotypes."^'^ The
same can be said about debiasing agents. The Court also stressed the value
of training future workers and leaders to operate in an "increasingly diverse
workforce and society."^"^ Although the Court did not specify a psycho-
logical mechanism, it implied that through exposure and interaction with
diverse others, students will leam to cooperate better across social catego-
ries and gain skills that will be increasingly valuable for business success
and national security. Again, the same goes for debiasing agents, except
that the psychological mechanism is more sharply delineated. If the Court
deems student diversity sufficiently "compelling" for miscellaneous peda-
gogical reasons including its tendency to decrease bias in future leaders,
workers, and citizens, then it should fmd the more focused objective of
decreasing implicit bias even more compelling.
In addition to serving a compelling state interest, an employer's con-
sideration of a candidate's debiasing capacity must be "narrowly tailored."
In this analysis, courts consider various factors, such as who benefits and
by how much, who is harmed and by how much, and whether the program
seems to be justified and bounded by something more than intuition. A
flexible "plus" factor, allowing a small, but not decisive, preference for
debiasing capacity would satisfy the requirements of Grutter. Those bur-
dened would simply have a slightly smaller chance of being hired; they
would not lose a vested interest such as a job or pension. Finally, the entire
program would be justified by science more rigorous than that accepted by
the Grutter Court.
If this sounds implausible, consider the line of "operational needs"
cases that have allowed race-based hiring in the law enforcement and cor-
rections context.^''^ Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Wittmer v. Peters'^'*'^
is instructive. That case involved a "boot camp" that served as an alterna-
tive to conventional prison. Sixty-eight percent of the inmates were
Black.^"* The boot camp hired a Black applicant as lieutenant over higher-
testing Whites. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of that decision.
A classroom may not seem comparable to boot camp (although some
might disagree). But there are interesting analogies. As Judge Posner ex-
plained, the justification for preferring the Black lieutenant in boot camp
244. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
245. W. at 321.
246. See. e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916,920 (7th Cir. 1996); Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d
233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979).
247. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.).
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was not a traditional role-model argument: the point was not to encourage
the inmates to become prison guards.^"*' The point also was not to create
proportional racial balancing between the staff and the inmates.^^" Instead,
"[t]he black lieutenant is needed because the black inmates are believed
unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and
brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the camp."^^'
Similarly, the point of debiasing agents is not to encourage Asians to be-
come professors (although, again, one would not object to that secondary
effect). Rather, it is to decrease the implicit bias within the entire student
body.
Arguably the case for debiasing agents is even stronger than the case
for the Black lieutenant in Wittmer. A colorblind enthusiast could argue
that Black irmiates' demand for Black lieutenants is a sort of pass-through
discrimination that should not be tolerated. After all, we do not let White
customer preference for White hostesses justify an employer's preference
for White hostesses, so why should we allow such a justification in the
boot camp context?
This objection, however, simply does not apply to the debiasing agent
rationale. The objection might have traction if a business school were hir-
ing an Asian professor to teach accounting because it speculated that its
students saw greater credibility or legitimacy in having a person of Asian
descent teach those classes.^" However, a debiasing agent is not deployed
to respect color or gender-conscious preferences within the student body; it
is targeted to override them. A debiasing agent is not sought to secure
some amorphous benefit such as "institutional legitimacy," within a for-
ward-looking frame. Instead, it is relentlessly focused on preventing dis-
crimination by decreasing demonstrable levels of bias among those within
its institution.
249. See id. at 920; see also Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Operational
need" refers to a law enforcement body's need to carry out its mission effectively, with a workforce
that appears unbiased, is able to communicate with the public and is respected by the community it
serves. "Role models," in contrast, are people whose very existence conveys a feeling of possibility to
others; they give hope that a previously restricted opportunity might now be available.).
250. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
251. Id. This type of reasoning is similar to some ofthe language in Grutter. See, e.g., Grutter,
539 U.S. at 332 ("In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes ofthe citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
integrity ofthe educational institutions that provide this training.").
252. Cf Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 475 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding illegal under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 an employer's policy of having Black employees call Black voters because it was based
on stereotypes, and rejecting the idea that race was a bona fide occupational qualification); Knight v.
Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 818
(1981) (holding that assigning an employee to do minority recruitment because of his race violates Title
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The case for debiasing agents also rests on a firmer scientific founda-
tion than did Wittmer. In Wittmer, Judge Posner emphasized that expert
testimony supported the "operational needs" justification.'^" He also noted
that some flexibility should be granted for experimentation, and that after
more research is done, the constitutional balance could be reconsidered.^^''
But on the record presented to the court, the racial preference was not un-
constitutional. Again, the same goes for debiasing agents. The scientific
foundation for debiasing agents is at least as strong as that deemed accept-
able in Wittmer. And, as the science improves, debiasing agent justifica-
tions and implementations can be adjusted accordingly.
Title VIL Even if debiasing-agent justifications pass the equal protec-
tion test, do they fail under Title VII, which may reject non-remedial objec-
tives? In Taxman v. Piscataway Township Board of Education,^^^ the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals en bane held that "a non-remedial affirmative ac-
tion plan, even one with a laudable purpose, cannot pass [Title VII's] mus-
^gj. "256 jj^g jjggg involved a school board's decision to break a tie between a
White and Black faculty member in a layoff decision in favor of the Black
teacher for forward-looking purposes.^" Interpreting the Supreme Court's
precedents Weber and Johnson, the Taxman court explained that in order
for a voluntary affirmative-action plan to be lawful, it must "have purposes
that mirror those of the [Title VII] statute".^^* As a matter of statutory in-
terpretation, the court held that Title VII was enacted to further two goals
only: to end discrimination, and to remedy the consequences of past dis-
crimination.^^' Since the Piscataway school board's justification did not fit
these objectives, its decision to break the tie on the basis of race violated
Title VII. No "additional non-remedial deviations"^*" would be tolerated.
There are, of course, good arguments on the other side; Taxman itself
generated four separate dissenting opinions. Further, after the reaffirmation
of diversity in Grutter, the practical precedential value of Taxman may
have weakened—even though Grutter was about equal protection, not Title
VII. In any event, the preference given to debiasing agents satisfies even
Taxman'% demanding standards. Again, the goal of crediting debiasing ca-
pacity is not to fiirther some general value in "diversity." Rather, it is to
stop discrimination by decreasing the implicit bias in students, who will
graduate to become future workers, employers, and leaders.
253. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920. Two years later, in McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219
(7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit declined to extend the reasoning of Wittmer to firefighters because
the evidentiary record did not exist. See id. at 1222.
254. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920-21.
255. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane).
256. W. at 1550.
257. /rf. at 1551-52.
258. Id. at 1550 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
259. Mat 1557.
260. Id at 1558.2006] FAIR MEASURES 1115
Constitutionally, this is a compelling interest. Statutorily, this objective is
consonant with the goals of Title VII, even as narrowly interpreted in
In sum, ISC outlines a new mechanism for decreasing implicit
bias: debiasing agents. We have not addressed various complications. For
instance, if the attitude toward a category is negative, then a friendly, ac-
commodating individual may be more effective in changing that attitude.
This would favor a particular sort of identity performance, one that pro-
vides racial comfort, not confrontation.^^^ These complications, although
significant, are not insurmountable. An even more powerful version of this
critique applies to the identity performance demanded of "role models."
Nevertheless, employers and educators regularly favor candidates who can
also be role models without theoretical angst. We also repeat that debiasing
agents are chosen not for their stereotypical qualities but for their counter-
typical ones. In the end, we have made a plausible case that preferring cer-
tain individuals because of their debiasing capacity can be a lawful fair
measure, especially in the context of higher education. The rationale is not
self-esteem; it is disinfection.
CONCLUSION
A NEW ENDING
So, when should affirmative action end? This is a vexing question
even for many proponents of affirmative action. Those who view affirma-
tive action as having backward-looking justification seek res judicata on
corrective justice claims. Those who view affirmative action as having
forward-looking justifications wonder whether there is any end point at all.
Indeed opponents of affirmative action regularly ask this question as a de-
bater's ploy to elicit a vague answer, which is then proffered as dispositive
evidence that affirmative action advocates are indefinite social engineers.
Recently, Justice O'Connor in her Grutter opinion predicted twenty-
five years.^" A rich literature interpreting what that deadline might mean as
261. Title VII also requires that voluntary affirmative action programs not "unnecessarily trammel
the interests ofthe [nonminorities]." Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. Those attributes that get the debiasing
agent program past equal protection "narrow tailoring" analysis simultaneously satisfy these Title VII
requirements.
262. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1805-06 (discussing "racial comfort"). Recall
that the Dasgupta and Asgari study placed Cosby and Farrakhan on different sides of the attitudinal
divide. This is where cultural studies meets cognitive psychology. As another example, debiasing
ability may become an additional job requirement implicitly placed on people of color and women but
not on White males. If there is only one slot for a woman or minority (given limited resources and
tokenism), an institution may decline to hire a candidate without demonstrable debiasing capacity even
though they do not require that a similar question is asked of White male candidates. Accordingly, a
soft spoken Asian woman may be penalized, whereas a soft spoken White man may not.
263. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("It has been 25 years since Justice Powell
first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores1116 CALIEORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
a matter of politics and precedent has already appeared. Many commenta-
tors observe that the deadline is mechanical, arbitrary,^*'' and arguably in-
coherent given the "diversity" justifications that O'Connor accepted. After
all, if racial integration produces pedagogical advantages through
"diversity," why should those benefits evaporate twenty-five years from
now? Notwithstanding such complaints, it takes a theory to beat a theory,
and critics are hard pressed to provide an alternative that is, on the one
hand, specific and objectively detennined, and, on the other hand, less arbi-
trary than O'Connor's deadline.
Implicit social cognition (ISC) offers new alternatives. The terminus
question can be framed at two levels of generality. At a specific level, the
question might be about when any specific fair measure becomes no longer
necessary. That question is conceptually easy to answer and depends on
why the specific fair measure was adopted in the first place. For example,
steps taken to provide fairer measures of merit can sunset when we demon-
strate that mismeasurement is no longer taking place. The narrow tailoring
here is obvious.
The more interesting question is framed at a higher level of abstrac-
tion. Generally speaking, when should "affirmative action" policies end?
We offer the following terminus: Fair measures that are race- or gender-
conscious^*' will become presumptively unnecessary when the nation's
implicit bias against those social categories goes to zero or its negligible
behavioral equivalent.^*^ For all those who praise colorblindness, this will
be when we as a nation become truly colorblind, not only to visible light
but also to the infrared frequencies that lurk beneath.^^^
This terminus rejects hypocrisy and self-deception. Recall the fasci-
nating finding of dissociation—that explicit self-reports of bias do not line
up with implicit measures of bias. Each of us has commented, in different
contexts, about the value of consciously struggling to rein in implicit bias
that is inconsistent with our explicit normative commitments.^** This
has indeed increased. We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.") (citation omitted).
264. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 24, at 248 n.l23.
265. Fair measures that are not race- or gender-conscious and that improve the accuracy of
measurements would never have to end.
266. What would count as a "negligible equivalent" is related to the strength of linkage between
implicit bias and real-world behavior, which is what we are most interested in. If implicit bias has been
reduced sufficiently such that behavior is not being affected, we could consider that level to be
negligible.
267. Justice Blackmun once wrote that "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The ISC variant of that paradox is that "In order to be blind, we must first see
the invisible."
268. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: Homage to Koan #7, in
PERSPECTIVISM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN AND YANG OF SCIENTIHC PROGRESS 127,134 (John
T. Jost et al. eds., 2003) ("[O]ne measure of the evolution of a society may indeed be the degree of2006] FAIR MEASURES 1117
terminus point demands alignment between our explicit self-descriptions
and our implicit states of mind.^*' Verbal gestures are not enough. Honest
mistakes, although honest, are still mistakes.
Also, this terminus has the advantage of being nonarbitrary, in sharp
contrast to Justice O'Connor's suggestion of twenty-five years, which
Justice Thomas read as a statute of limitations more than a mere predic-
tion.^™ Moreover, this terminus is specific and objectively measurable.
Implementing a national gauge may sound implausible, but it is not wishful
thinking. Modem technology can already measure where an entire society
stands on various biases through reliable and anonymous web-based data
collection^^' To be sure, our proposal triggers myriad questions about
which specific measures of implicit bias, taken through which specific in-
struments, against which specific categories, with which specific level of
confidence. Still, compared to other proposals on the table, we believe that
this one has the potential to be the most completely specified, objectively
implementable, and narrowly tailored.
Our revision of "affirmative action" into "fair measures" provides a
new framing for social intervention in favor of equality. Unwarranted dis-
crimination exists here and now: it can be documented through scientific
methods that cannot be dismissed as hyperbole or playing the "race card."
We are not merely pointing to disparities between social groups, which in
and of itself may not trouble many Americans. Instead, we suggest that
some of these disparities may be caused by discrimination that arises from
ordinary forms of implicit bias in our minds, here and now.
The very same science that allows us to document implicit bias and its
discriminatory consequences also provides new insight into the ways that
we can individually and collectively debias our institutions and ourselves.
Taking fair measures is simply the implementation of these measures.
These measures will not, and are not designed to, respond to all genuine
and meritorious claims on the distribution of scarce resources. As ex-
plained earlier, corrective and distributive justice claims might be made
under the banner of "affirmative action" or "social justice" that "fair
separation between conscious and unconscious attitudes—that is, the degree to which primitive implicit
evaluations that disfavor certain social groups or outgroups are explicitly corrected at the conscious
level at which control is possible."); Kang, supra note 12, at 1587-88 ("[S]ocial strategies that decrease
the dissociation that we as a society collectively experience should be seen as autonomy-
reinforcing .... How could it be against autonomy to bring our implicit thoughts in line with our
explicit ones?").
269. This argument takes advantage ofthe contingent fact that our official public ideology rejects
bias across social categories. In other words, if we lived in a social and legal system that officially
endorsed castes, in which explicit bias against lower social categories was accepted, we would not call
for alignment as the solution.
270. Justice Thomas took this deadline seriously and wrote "that racial discrimination in higher
education admissions will be illegal in 25 years." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
271. See Nosek, supra note 47.1118 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1063
measures" simply does not cover. We neither foreclose nor dismiss those
conversations and struggles. But to these crucial ongoing debates, we seek
to add something new, something that science has uncovered. Driven by a
behavioral realist accounting of implicit social cognition, we sketch out a
new terrain of fair measures. Although not vast, it is a significant place,
one that establishes the foundation for tie-breakers and debiasing agents
while demolishing facile assurances that we are all already colorblind. This
terrain, we hope, can become new common ground—a field that seeks to
be level, measured, and fair.